Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality - Logi Gunnarsson
Book Reviews
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10688606 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher Buford (University of Akron, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue | 243 |
| Pages | 418-420 |
| Publication date | 2011-04-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.695_4.x |
| OpenAlex | W2161543132 |
| Language | EN |
Logi Gunnarsson's book is an ambitious effort that addresses many of the philosophical issues often discussed by philosophers (and others) under the heading of ‘personal identity’. Gunnarsson argues for five theses, though I here mention what I take to be the two most controversial of the theses. First, co‐existence (CE): ‘each of us is a fundamental entity, of which there could exist (at the same time) two or more in one body’. For Gunnarsson, my persistence‐conditions are determined by the type of fundamental entity I am. (CE) rules out theories of personal identity which identify human persons with their bodies. It also appears to be incompatible with animalism, the view that each of us is numerically identical with and has the persistence‐conditions of a human animal. Though co‐existence is deemed to be possible, Gunnarsson argues that there have been no actual cases. Hence he endorses the thesis non‐actual (NA): ‘the conditions for the presence of two or more fundamental entities in one body are never fulfilled in reality’
Aesthetics · Biology · Epistemology · Identity (music) · Persistence (discontinuity) · Personal identity · Self · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Highly cited | No |
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