Christophe de Ray
Biographic Data
| ID | 5966387 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christophe de Ray |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christophe |
| FAMILY NAME | de Ray |
| SIGNATURE | DE RAY C |
| AFFILIATIONS | King's College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0540-8000 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
A Berkeleyan Argument against Non-Naïve Realism
In Defence of the Pauline Principle
The so‐called ‘Pauline Principle’ holds that ‘one may not do evil that good may come’. I take this to mean that it is immoral to intend intrinsically evil states of affairs as a means to good. I offer an argument in favour of this principle. My argument takes the immorality of malevolent attitudes as its starting point, and contends that these attitudes typically (and perhaps exclusively) involve what Aquinas calls the ‘accidental’ willing of evi…
Seeing through the forms ‐ towards a Platonic indirect realism
Universals in the Platonic tradition were intended to play both metaphysical and epistemological roles. The contemporary debate around universals has focused overwhelmingly on the former, with even ‘platonists’ typically holding that our knowledge of universals is derived from our knowledge of particulars. In contrast, I wish to argue for the epistemological primacy of the universal: specifically, I defend the thesis that we perceive particulars …
Seeing the Good––Towards a Platonic theory of well-being
Plato appears to have held that happiness (or well-being) consists in ‘knowing’ the Good in some way. I defend a view of this kind, arguing that well-being essentially involves the awareness of the Good. I do this, first by contending that great goods (e.g. friendship, knowledge etc.) can only contribute to our well-being if we appreciate them––that is, if we are aware of their value. This, I argue, amounts to being aware of the Good in them. I a…
Corruptio boni
The classic ‘privation theory’ of evil defines evil as an absence (or ‘privation’) of a good that ought to obtain. Despite its historical importance, privation theory is faced with a number of serious difficulties. I outline two of these difficulties and argue that they continue to pose a threat. I then present ‘corruption theory’, an alternative theory of evil reconstructed from some of Augustine's writings on the subject. I argue that this theo…
Is the desire for life rational
The question of the meaning of life has long been thought to be closely intertwined with that of the existence of God. I offer a new theistic, anti-naturalist argument from the meaning of life. It is argued that the desire for life is irrational on naturalism, since there would be no good reason to believe that life is worthwhile on the whole if naturalism were true. As I show, the same cannot be argued of theism. Since it is clear that the desir…
Existence exists, and it is God
Much of historic Christian philosophical theology has affirmed that God not only exists, but is Existence itself. Nowadays, this claim is widely rejected as unintelligible by theists and non-theists alike. I argue in contrast that if there is such a thing as Existence itself, that thing must be a maximally excellent being, which is what many philosophers call God. This is because Existence would itself need to exist, which is only possible if Exi…
An Evolutionary Sceptical Challenge to Scientific Realism
Evolutionary scepticism holds that the evolutionary account of the origins of the human cognitive apparatus has sceptical implications for at least some of our beliefs. A common target of evolutionary scepticism is moral realism. Scientific realism, on the other hand, is much less frequently targeted, though the idea that evolutionary theory should make us distrustful of science is by no means absent from the literature. This line of thought has …
Why the Good is supremely good
The opening chapters of Anselm's Monologion contain a ‘proof’ of a perfect being, which has received far less attention than the more famous Proslogion proof, and the ontological arguments derived from it. I wish to rectify this by developing an argument in defence of a crucial premise of the Monologion proof. This premise states that ‘the Good’, i.e. that in virtue of which numerically distinct things may all be good, must itself be a supremely …
A new epistemological case for theism
Relying on inference to the best explanation (IBE) requires one to hold the intuition that the world is ‘intelligible’, that is, such that states of affairs at least generally have explanations for their obtaining. I argue that metaphysical naturalists are rationally required to withhold this intuition, unless they cease to be naturalists. This is because all plausible naturalistic aetiologies of the intuition entail that the intuition and the st…
No prominent works on this page.
An Evolutionary Sceptical Challenge to Scientific Realism
Evolutionary scepticism holds that the evolutionary account of the origins of the human cognitive apparatus has sceptical implications for at least some of our beliefs. A common target of evolutionary scepticism is moral realism. Scientific realism, on the other hand, is much less frequently targeted, though the idea that evolutionary theory should make us distrustful of science is by no means absent from the literature. This line of thought has …
Why the Good is supremely good
The opening chapters of Anselm's Monologion contain a ‘proof’ of a perfect being, which has received far less attention than the more famous Proslogion proof, and the ontological arguments derived from it. I wish to rectify this by developing an argument in defence of a crucial premise of the Monologion proof. This premise states that ‘the Good’, i.e. that in virtue of which numerically distinct things may all be good, must itself be a supremely …
A new epistemological case for theism
Relying on inference to the best explanation (IBE) requires one to hold the intuition that the world is ‘intelligible’, that is, such that states of affairs at least generally have explanations for their obtaining. I argue that metaphysical naturalists are rationally required to withhold this intuition, unless they cease to be naturalists. This is because all plausible naturalistic aetiologies of the intuition entail that the intuition and the st…
Is the desire for life rational
The question of the meaning of life has long been thought to be closely intertwined with that of the existence of God. I offer a new theistic, anti-naturalist argument from the meaning of life. It is argued that the desire for life is irrational on naturalism, since there would be no good reason to believe that life is worthwhile on the whole if naturalism were true. As I show, the same cannot be argued of theism. Since it is clear that the desir…
Existence exists, and it is God
Much of historic Christian philosophical theology has affirmed that God not only exists, but is Existence itself. Nowadays, this claim is widely rejected as unintelligible by theists and non-theists alike. I argue in contrast that if there is such a thing as Existence itself, that thing must be a maximally excellent being, which is what many philosophers call God. This is because Existence would itself need to exist, which is only possible if Exi…
Corruptio boni
The classic ‘privation theory’ of evil defines evil as an absence (or ‘privation’) of a good that ought to obtain. Despite its historical importance, privation theory is faced with a number of serious difficulties. I outline two of these difficulties and argue that they continue to pose a threat. I then present ‘corruption theory’, an alternative theory of evil reconstructed from some of Augustine's writings on the subject. I argue that this theo…
A Berkeleyan Argument against Non-Naïve Realism
In Defence of the Pauline Principle
The so‐called ‘Pauline Principle’ holds that ‘one may not do evil that good may come’. I take this to mean that it is immoral to intend intrinsically evil states of affairs as a means to good. I offer an argument in favour of this principle. My argument takes the immorality of malevolent attitudes as its starting point, and contends that these attitudes typically (and perhaps exclusively) involve what Aquinas calls the ‘accidental’ willing of evi…
Seeing through the forms ‐ towards a Platonic indirect realism
Universals in the Platonic tradition were intended to play both metaphysical and epistemological roles. The contemporary debate around universals has focused overwhelmingly on the former, with even ‘platonists’ typically holding that our knowledge of universals is derived from our knowledge of particulars. In contrast, I wish to argue for the epistemological primacy of the universal: specifically, I defend the thesis that we perceive particulars …
Seeing the Good––Towards a Platonic theory of well-being
Plato appears to have held that happiness (or well-being) consists in ‘knowing’ the Good in some way. I defend a view of this kind, arguing that well-being essentially involves the awareness of the Good. I do this, first by contending that great goods (e.g. friendship, knowledge etc.) can only contribute to our well-being if we appreciate them––that is, if we are aware of their value. This, I argue, amounts to being aware of the Good in them. I a…
Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (6 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Theism (4 works) · Medieval Philosophy and Theology (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Realism (3 works)