A new epistemological case for theism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20310965 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christophe de Ray (0000-0002-0540-8000, King's College London, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 379-400 |
| Publication date | 2022-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412520000529 |
| OpenAlex | W3125879384 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 29 |
Relying on inference to the best explanation (IBE) requires one to hold the intuition that the world is ‘intelligible’, that is, such that states of affairs at least generally have explanations for their obtaining. I argue that metaphysical naturalists are rationally required to withhold this intuition, unless they cease to be naturalists. This is because all plausible naturalistic aetiologies of the intuition entail that the intuition and the state of affairs which it represents are not causally connected in an epistemically appropriate way. Given that one ought to rely on IBE, naturalists are forced to pick the latter and change their world-view. Traditional theists, in contrast, do not face this predicament. This, I argue, is strong grounds for preferring traditional theism to naturalism
Epistemology · Inference · Intuition · Metaphysics · Naturalism · Theism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
Laws and Symmetry
The Architecture of the Mind
Warrant and Proper Function
Inference to the Best Explanation
Two accounts of laws and time
Mathematical Truth
Natural Kinds
Every Thing Must Go
An Evolutionary Sceptical Challenge to Scientific Realism
Van Fraassen's critique of inference to the best explanation
Blind variation and selective retentions in creative thought as in other knowledge processes
Meditations on first philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |