Taro Okamura
Biographic Data
| ID | 5966495 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Taro Okamura |
| GIVEN NAMES | Taro |
| FAMILY NAME | Okamura |
| SIGNATURE | OKAMURA T |
| AFFILIATIONS | The University of Tokyo |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Reason in tranquility: Hume's critique of superstition
This paper examines a tension in Hume's philosophy between his epistemic critique of superstition and his naturalistic epistemology. While Hume faults superstition for its epistemic flaws, naturalistic interpretations often claim that he evaluates reasoning by its psychological force, such as liveliness or irresistibility. This raises a challenge: if superstitious reasoning stems from standard psychological processes and exhibits psychological st…
Hume's Constitutivist Response to Scepticism
In the concluding section of the Book One of the Treatise, Hume confronts radical scepticism about the standards of correct reasoning. According to the naturalistic interpretations, Hume resolves this scepticism by appealing to some psychological facts. A common criticism of this interpretation is that the alleged naturalistic epistemic norm seems to be merely Hume’s report of his psychology, and it remains unclear why this seemingly mere psychol…
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Hume's Constitutivist Response to Scepticism
In the concluding section of the Book One of the Treatise, Hume confronts radical scepticism about the standards of correct reasoning. According to the naturalistic interpretations, Hume resolves this scepticism by appealing to some psychological facts. A common criticism of this interpretation is that the alleged naturalistic epistemic norm seems to be merely Hume’s report of his psychology, and it remains unclear why this seemingly mere psychol…
Reason in tranquility: Hume's critique of superstition
This paper examines a tension in Hume's philosophy between his epistemic critique of superstition and his naturalistic epistemology. While Hume faults superstition for its epistemic flaws, naturalistic interpretations often claim that he evaluates reasoning by its psychological force, such as liveliness or irresistibility. This raises a challenge: if superstitious reasoning stems from standard psychological processes and exhibits psychological st…
Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Certainty (1 works) · Epistemology (1 works) · Falsity (1 works) · History (1 works) · Hume's philosophy and hair distribution (1 works) · Naturalism (1 works) · Normative (1 works) · Passions (1 works) · Philosophy (1 works)