Reason in tranquility

Hume's critique of superstition

Bibliographic Data

ID10690520
AuthorsTaro Okamura (Kyoto University, corresponding author)
Year2025
Publication date2025-09-22
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqaf085
OpenAlexW4414453612
LanguageEN
References cited28

This paper examines a tension in Hume's philosophy between his epistemic critique of superstition and his naturalistic epistemology. While Hume faults superstition for its epistemic flaws, naturalistic interpretations often claim that he evaluates reasoning by its psychological force, such as liveliness or irresistibility. This raises a challenge: if superstitious reasoning stems from standard psychological processes and exhibits psychological strength, how can it be epistemically discredited? I argue that Hume's notion of good reasoning involves more than psychological force. He appeals to calm passions as an additional normative standard. Calm passions arise in response to epistemic factors, particularly certainty, whereas superstitious reasoning provokes violent passions through its uncertainty. Importantly, however, calmness does not require absolute certainty, and it marks a moderate and attainable level of epistemic commitment—one that enables inquiry while resisting the violent agitation characteristic of both superstition and radical skepticism

Certainty · Falsity · Naturalism · Normative · Passions · Received view of theories · Superstition · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Theological Perspectives and Practices

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