Simon Wimmer
Biographic Data
| ID | 5966704 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Simon Wimmer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Simon |
| FAMILY NAME | Wimmer |
| SIGNATURE | WIMMER S |
| AFFILIATIONS | TU Dortmund University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5346-9986 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Mapping climate change coverage
The media shapes how political leaders and the public understand the causes, impacts, and solutions to climate change. Here, we provide the most extensive analysis to date of how German news media report on climate change between 2010 and 2024. We develop and validate a methodology based on large language models to analyze the contents of over 50,000 articles from seven major newspapers across the political spectrum. We found that aspects relatin…
Cook Wilson on judgement
John Cook Wilson is increasingly recognized as an important predecessor of ordinary language philosophy. He emphasizes the authority of ordinary language in philosophical theorizing. At the same time, however, he circumscribes the limits of that authority and identifies cases in which it threatens to mislead us. My aim is to consider in detail one case where, according to Cook Wilson, ordinary language has mislead philosophical theorizing. Judgem…
Ways to Knowledge-First Believe
On a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief, to believe p is to $$\Phi $$ Φ (e.g. treat p ) as if one knew p . I challenge this view by arguing against various regimentations of it. I conclude by generalizing my argument to alternative knowledge-first views suggested by Williamson and Wimmer
On Believing
Journal Article On Believing: Being Right in a World of Possibilities Get access On Believing: Being Right in a World of Possibilities. By David Hunter. (Oxford: OUP, 2022. Pp. xi + 244. Price £55.00) Simon Wimmer Simon Wimmer Technische Universität Dortmund, Germany Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 73, Issue 3, July 2023, Pages 926–928, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad020…
John Cook Wilson on the indefinability of knowledge
Can knowledge be defined? We expound an argument of John Cook Wilson's that it cannot. Cook Wilson's argument connects knowing with having the power to inquire. We suggest that if he is right about that connection, then knowledge is, indeed, indefinable
Reductive Views of Knowledge and the Small Difference Principle
I develop a challenge to reductive views of knowing that $ \phi $ that appeal to what I call a gradable property. Such appeal allows for properties that are intrinsically very similar to the property of knowing that $ \phi $ , but differ significantly in their normative significance. This violates the independently plausible claim Pautz (2017) labels the ‘small difference principle.’
Cook Wilson on knowledge and forms of thinking
John Cook Wilson is an important predecessor of contemporary knowledge first epistemologists: among other parallels, he claimed that knowledge is indefinable. We reconstruct four arguments for this claim discernible in his work, three of which find no clear analogues in contemporary discussions of knowledge first epistemology. We pay special attention to Cook Wilson’s view of the relation between knowledge and forms of thinking (like belief). Cla…
Belief does not entail a reasoning disposition
Are there any dispositions one must have if one believes p ? A widespread answer emphasizes the role of beliefs in reasoning and holds that if one believes p , one must be disposed to treat p as true (rely on p /use p as a premise) in one’s reasoning. I argue that this answer is subject to counterexamples
Knowledge-first believing the unknowable
I develop a challenge for a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief that turns, primarily, on unknowable propositions. I consider and reject several responses to my challenge and sketch a new knowledge-first account of belief that avoids it
Knowledge-first believing the unknowable
I develop a challenge for a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief that turns, primarily, on unknowable propositions. I consider and reject several responses to my challenge and sketch a new knowledge-first account of belief that avoids it
Belief does not entail a reasoning disposition
Are there any dispositions one must have if one believes p ? A widespread answer emphasizes the role of beliefs in reasoning and holds that if one believes p , one must be disposed to treat p as true (rely on p /use p as a premise) in one’s reasoning. I argue that this answer is subject to counterexamples
Knowledge-first believing the unknowable
I develop a challenge for a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief that turns, primarily, on unknowable propositions. I consider and reject several responses to my challenge and sketch a new knowledge-first account of belief that avoids it
John Cook Wilson on the indefinability of knowledge
Can knowledge be defined? We expound an argument of John Cook Wilson's that it cannot. Cook Wilson's argument connects knowing with having the power to inquire. We suggest that if he is right about that connection, then knowledge is, indeed, indefinable
Reductive Views of Knowledge and the Small Difference Principle
I develop a challenge to reductive views of knowing that $ \phi $ that appeal to what I call a gradable property. Such appeal allows for properties that are intrinsically very similar to the property of knowing that $ \phi $ , but differ significantly in their normative significance. This violates the independently plausible claim Pautz (2017) labels the ‘small difference principle.’
Cook Wilson on knowledge and forms of thinking
John Cook Wilson is an important predecessor of contemporary knowledge first epistemologists: among other parallels, he claimed that knowledge is indefinable. We reconstruct four arguments for this claim discernible in his work, three of which find no clear analogues in contemporary discussions of knowledge first epistemology. We pay special attention to Cook Wilson’s view of the relation between knowledge and forms of thinking (like belief). Cla…
Ways to Knowledge-First Believe
On a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief, to believe p is to $$\Phi $$ Φ (e.g. treat p ) as if one knew p . I challenge this view by arguing against various regimentations of it. I conclude by generalizing my argument to alternative knowledge-first views suggested by Williamson and Wimmer
On Believing
Journal Article On Believing: Being Right in a World of Possibilities Get access On Believing: Being Right in a World of Possibilities. By David Hunter. (Oxford: OUP, 2022. Pp. xi + 244. Price £55.00) Simon Wimmer Simon Wimmer Technische Universität Dortmund, Germany Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 73, Issue 3, July 2023, Pages 926–928, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad020…
Cook Wilson on judgement
John Cook Wilson is increasingly recognized as an important predecessor of ordinary language philosophy. He emphasizes the authority of ordinary language in philosophical theorizing. At the same time, however, he circumscribes the limits of that authority and identifies cases in which it threatens to mislead us. My aim is to consider in detail one case where, according to Cook Wilson, ordinary language has mislead philosophical theorizing. Judgem…
Mapping climate change coverage
The media shapes how political leaders and the public understand the causes, impacts, and solutions to climate change. Here, we provide the most extensive analysis to date of how German news media report on climate change between 2010 and 2024. We develop and validate a methodology based on large language models to analyze the contents of over 50,000 articles from seven major newspapers across the political spectrum. We found that aspects relatin…
Philosophy (8 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works)