Cook Wilson on judgement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21597840 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Simon Wimmer (0000-0001-5346-9986, Institut für Philosophie und Politikwissenschaft, Technische Universität Dortmund, Dortmund, Germany, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 126-149 |
| Publication date | 2024-01-02 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09608788.2023.2228848 |
| OpenAlex | W4385580664 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 29 |
John Cook Wilson is increasingly recognized as an important predecessor of ordinary language philosophy. He emphasizes the authority of ordinary language in philosophical theorizing. At the same time, however, he circumscribes the limits of that authority and identifies cases in which it threatens to mislead us. My aim is to consider in detail one case where, according to Cook Wilson, ordinary language has mislead philosophical theorizing. Judgement was one of the core notions of the logic, epistemology, and philosophy of mind of Cook Wilson’s time. Cook Wilson rejects this notion, in the form developed by his contemporaries, in part because it is based on a problematic analogy between ordinary language and the thoughts expressed in that language. Cook Wilson’s discussion of judgement also highlights the extent to which Cook Wilson was critical of, but also responsive to, his contemporaries. In addition, variants of the language-thought analogy Cook Wilson opposes continue to feature in twenty-first century epistemology and philosophy of mind. Cook Wilson’s criticism of the analogy thus raises questions about recent work as well as the theories of his contemporaries
Analogy · Criticism · Epistemology · Judgement · Literature · Ordinary language philosophy · Western philosophy · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke
Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt
Belief's Own Ethics
Ii.—on Denoting
Iii.—knowledge and Belief
Statement and Inference.
John Cook Wilson on the indefinability of knowledge
First saying, then believing
I.—A Plea for Excuses
Cook Wilson on knowledge and forms of thinking
Belief in Kant
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility
Locke and Hume on Belief, Judgment and Assent
Some observations concerning mental verbs and speech act verbs
| Highly cited | No |
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