Daniel Devereux
Biographic Data
| ID | 5966809 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Devereux |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Devereux |
| SIGNATURE | DEVEREUX D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Virginia |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 13 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1975 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Meno Re-Examined
Dominic Scott has written an exemplary commentary on Plato's Meno. The scholarship is meticulous and thorough. Each argument and section of the dialogue is discussed in detail and with great care; different interpretations are treated fairly and sympathetically; interesting connections are drawn between parts of Meno and other dialogues, e.g., between the recollection passage and related sections of Phaedo and Phaedrus, and between the argument f…
Colloquium 7
Aristotle on the Perfect Life
Socrates' Kantian Conception of Virtue
Socrates' Kantian Conception of Virtue DANIEL T. DEVEREUX Is it not necessaryfor all men to consider self-mastery [~fxOdxeta] thefoundation of virtue, and to train their souls first and foremost in this? (Xenophon, Memorabilia I 5,4) Virtue [Tugend] is fortitude in relation to the forces opposing a moral attitude of will in us. (Kant, Tugendlehre, Akademie edition, 38o) SOCRATES'DENIALOF incontinence is well known. Not so well known, though firml…
Separation and Immanence in Plato’s Theory of Forms
According to Aristotle’s terse report, Plato separated Forms from sensible particulars, and in doing so he departed from Socrates’ view of the relationship between universals and their participants. Until recently, most scholars accepted Aristotle’s statement as fundamentally accurate, and they understood separation to involve both the denial that Forms are immanent in sensible particulars as well as the positive claim that they are ‘ontologicall…
Inherence and Primary Substance in Aristotle’s Categories
The Unity of the Virtues in Plato's Protagoras and Laches
perhaps most striking of Socratic paradoxes is claim that being a good person is strictly a matter of intellect. As Aristotle remarks, Socrates seems to take no account of character in his conception of virtue. 1 In Plato's early dialogues, Socrates argues that a certain type of (knowledge of good and evil) is sufficient for being a just, courageous, and temperate person, and for behaving in way such a person would behave. But this claim does not…
Analyse Genetique de la Metaphysique D'Aristote
Essence, Existence, and Nominal Definition in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics II 8-10
Our aim in this paper is to clarify the various things Aristotle says about nominal definitions in Book II of the Posterior Analytics. In the early chapters of Book II Aristotle develops a series of puzzles concerning the nature of definition and its relationship to scientific demonstration. In chapters 8-10 answers to the puzzles are given in the course of a positive account of the different types of definitions and how they are related to Arist…
Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics
Socrates' First City in the Republic
Nature and Teaching in Plato's Meno
In a controversial passage in the Meno, Socrates argues that virtue cannot be taught (89 c-96 c).1 Such a view is hard to square with the thesis that virtue is knowledge, and for this reason there is a longstanding debate over whether Socrates' argument is meant seriously.2 In this paper I shall try to determine exactly where Socrates stands on the question whether virtue can be taught, as well as on the more general question of how men come to p…
Protagoras on Courage and Knowledge
The Unity of the Virtues in Plato's Protagoras and Laches
perhaps most striking of Socratic paradoxes is claim that being a good person is strictly a matter of intellect. As Aristotle remarks, Socrates seems to take no account of character in his conception of virtue. 1 In Plato's early dialogues, Socrates argues that a certain type of (knowledge of good and evil) is sufficient for being a just, courageous, and temperate person, and for behaving in way such a person would behave. But this claim does not…
Protagoras on Courage and Knowledge
Nature and Teaching in Plato's Meno
In a controversial passage in the Meno, Socrates argues that virtue cannot be taught (89 c-96 c).1 Such a view is hard to square with the thesis that virtue is knowledge, and for this reason there is a longstanding debate over whether Socrates' argument is meant seriously.2 In this paper I shall try to determine exactly where Socrates stands on the question whether virtue can be taught, as well as on the more general question of how men come to p…
Socrates' First City in the Republic
Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics
Essence, Existence, and Nominal Definition in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics II 8-10
Our aim in this paper is to clarify the various things Aristotle says about nominal definitions in Book II of the Posterior Analytics. In the early chapters of Book II Aristotle develops a series of puzzles concerning the nature of definition and its relationship to scientific demonstration. In chapters 8-10 answers to the puzzles are given in the course of a positive account of the different types of definitions and how they are related to Arist…
Analyse Genetique de la Metaphysique D'Aristote
Inherence and Primary Substance in Aristotle’s Categories
The Unity of the Virtues in Plato's Protagoras and Laches
perhaps most striking of Socratic paradoxes is claim that being a good person is strictly a matter of intellect. As Aristotle remarks, Socrates seems to take no account of character in his conception of virtue. 1 In Plato's early dialogues, Socrates argues that a certain type of (knowledge of good and evil) is sufficient for being a just, courageous, and temperate person, and for behaving in way such a person would behave. But this claim does not…
Separation and Immanence in Plato’s Theory of Forms
According to Aristotle’s terse report, Plato separated Forms from sensible particulars, and in doing so he departed from Socrates’ view of the relationship between universals and their participants. Until recently, most scholars accepted Aristotle’s statement as fundamentally accurate, and they understood separation to involve both the denial that Forms are immanent in sensible particulars as well as the positive claim that they are ‘ontologicall…
Socrates' Kantian Conception of Virtue
Socrates' Kantian Conception of Virtue DANIEL T. DEVEREUX Is it not necessaryfor all men to consider self-mastery [~fxOdxeta] thefoundation of virtue, and to train their souls first and foremost in this? (Xenophon, Memorabilia I 5,4) Virtue [Tugend] is fortitude in relation to the forces opposing a moral attitude of will in us. (Kant, Tugendlehre, Akademie edition, 38o) SOCRATES'DENIALOF incontinence is well known. Not so well known, though firml…
Aristotle on the Perfect Life
Colloquium 7
Meno Re-Examined
Dominic Scott has written an exemplary commentary on Plato's Meno. The scholarship is meticulous and thorough. Each argument and section of the dialogue is discussed in detail and with great care; different interpretations are treated fairly and sympathetically; interesting connections are drawn between parts of Meno and other dialogues, e.g., between the recollection passage and related sections of Phaedo and Phaedrus, and between the argument f…
Classical Philosophy and Thought (12 works) · Philosophy (12 works) · Epistemology (11 works) · SOCRATES (4 works) · Analytic philosophy (3 works) · Ancient philosophy (3 works) · Contemporary philosophy (3 works) · General interest (3 works) · Virtue (3 works) · Art (2 works)