Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

The Unity of the Virtues in Plato's Protagoras and Laches

Bibliographic Data

ID10700461
AuthorsDaniel Devereux (corresponding author), Daniel T Devereux
Year1992
Volume101
Issue4
Pages765
Publication date1992-10-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2185924
OpenAlexW2318732517
LanguageEN
Citations received27

perhaps most striking of Socratic paradoxes is claim that being a good person is strictly a matter of intellect. As Aristotle remarks, Socrates seems to take no account of character in his conception of virtue. 1 In Plato's early dialogues, Socrates argues that a certain type of (knowledge of good and evil) is sufficient for being a just, courageous, and temperate person, and for behaving in way such a person would behave. But this claim does not capture what is most paradoxical about his view of relationship between virtue and knowledge. Even soberminded Aristotle held that a certain type of knowledge-phrone~sis or practical wisdom-is sufficient for virtue. But being a good person is not simply a matter of having a certain kind of for Aristotle, since he also believed that one could not be practically wise without having a good character. Socrates made further claim that all virtues are knowledge; that is, he held that each of virtues is definable simply in terms of either a single type of or several types corresponding to several virtues.2 It is this stronger view that people have in mind when they speak of Socrates' intellectualism; there is no need to tame unruly passions-knowledge of good ensures that one will have right aims and intentions, and will act accordingly. In Protagoras, Plato has Socrates argue not only that all virtues are knowledge, but also that they somehow form a unity. Exactly what sort of unity Socrates has in mind is a matter of controversy. According to one interpretation, Socrates regards different virtues as distinct parts of a whole-distinct in sense that each has its own separate definition.3 The thesis that the virtues are knowledge is understood as claim that each virtue

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy

  • Becoming Godlike

    Open Access•David Sedley•Cambridge Companion to Ancient…•2017

  • Plato on Education and Art

    Rachana Kamtekar•The Oxford Handbook of Plato…•2009

  • Plato's Metaphysics

    Verity Harte•The Oxford Handbook of Plato…•2009

  • Plato on Love

    Richard Kraut•The Oxford Handbook of Plato…•2009

  • Socrates, the primary question, and the unity of virtue

    Open Access•Justin C Clark•Canadian Journal of Philosophy•2015

  • Horace and Practical Philosophy

    Open Access•Terence Irwin•Cambridge Companion to Ancient…•2017

  • Aristotle on Virtue and Happiness

    Open Access•David Charles•Cambridge Companion to Ancient…•2017

  • The Stoics’ Ethical Psychology

    Open Access•Margaret Graver•Cambridge Companion to Ancient…•2017

  • Plato in his Time and Place

    Malcolm Schofield•The Oxford Handbook of Plato…•2009

  • Plato and Platonism

    Charles Brittain•The Oxford Handbook of Plato…•2009

  • Socrates' Kantian Conception of Virtue

    Daniel Devereux•Journal of the history of…•1995

  • Socratic Moral Psychology

    Open Access•Thomas C Brickhouse, Nicholas D Smith•Socratic Moral Psychology•2010

  • Plato's Philosophy of Language

    Paolo Crivelli•The Oxford Handbook of Plato…•2009

  • The Oxford Handbook of Plato

    Gail Fine•The Oxford Handbook of Plato…•2008

  • Aristotle’s Ethical Psychology

    Open Access•Jessica Moss•Cambridge Companion to Ancient…•2017

  • Plato's Introduction of Forms

    Open Access•R M Dancy•Plato's Introduction of Forms•2001

  • The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Ethics

    Open Access•Lorelle D Semley, Christopher Bobonich•Cambridge Companion to Ancient…•2017

  • The Stoics on Virtue and Happiness

    Open Access•Katja Maria Vogt•Cambridge Companion to Ancient…•2017

  • Plato's Epistemology

    C C W Taylor•The Oxford Handbook of Plato…•2009

  • The Sophist on Statements, Predication, and Falsehood

    Lesley Brown•The Oxford Handbook of Plato…•2009

  • Trials of Reason

    David Wolfsdorf, David Conan Wolfsdorf•Trials of Reason•2007

  • The Unity of the Ideal Virtues

    Open Access•Robert Weston Siscoe•Pacific philosophical quarterly•2025

  • Socrates, the ‘What is F-ness?’ Question, and the Priority of Definition

    Justin Clark, Justin C Clark•Archiv für Geschichte der…•2022

  • Immoral authorities

    Michele Acuto•Journal of Global Ethics•2010

  • Good Life, Brave Death, and Earned Immortality

    Open Access•Sami Yli-Karjanmaa, Elisa Uusimäki•Open Theology•2022

  • Can virtue be unified? An Aristotelian justification on “unity of virtue”

    Manik Konch•South African Journal of Philosophy•2024

  • Unity of the intellectual virtues

    Open Access•Arnold T Wilson•Synthese•2021

Citations per year0.87
Citation span1995 - 2025 (31)
Highly citedNo

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae