Rohan Sud
Biographic Data
| ID | 5969041 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Rohan Sud |
| GIVEN NAMES | Rohan |
| FAMILY NAME | Sud |
| SIGNATURE | SUD R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Virginia Tech |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7542-632X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Reference Magnetism Beyond the Predicate
Many accept David Lewis's (1983) claim that, among the candidate meanings for our predicates, some are more natural than others—they do better or worse at “carving nature at its joints.” Call this claim predicate naturalism. Disagreement remains over whether the notion of naturalness extends “beyond the predicate'” (à la Sider, 2011). Are the candidate meanings of logical vocabulary also more or less natural? Call this claim logical naturalism. O…
Vagueness, normativity, and inescapable questions
Our concept bald displays all of the features paradigmatic of vagueness. For instance, it is sorites-susceptible. Moreover, the concept allows for cases of a distinctive kind in the middling part of the sorites series – cases for which it seems “there is just no fact of the matter” whether the member is bald. Our concept ought displays some of these same features. For instance, it too is sorites-susceptible. However, there is a difference. The mi…
Modal normativism on semantic rules
According to Amie Thomasson's modal normativism, the function of modal discourse is to convey semantic rules. But what is a “semantic rule”? I raise three worries according to which there is no conception of a semantic rule that can serve the needs of a modal normativist. The first worry focuses on de re and a posteriori necessities. The second worry concerns Thomasson's inferential specification of the meaning of modal terms. The third worry ask…
Quantifier Variance, Vague Existence, and Metaphysical Vagueness
This paper asks: Is the quantifier variantist committed to metaphysical vagueness? My investigation of this question goes via a study of vague existence. I’ll argue that the quantifier variantist is committed to vague existence and that the vague existence posited by the variantist requires a puzzling sort of metaphysical vagueness. Specifically, I distinguish between (what I call) positive and negative metaphysical vagueness. Positive metaphysic…
Plurivaluationism, supersententialism and the problem of the many languages
Plurivaluationism, supersententialism and the problem of the many languages
Quantifier Variance, Vague Existence, and Metaphysical Vagueness
This paper asks: Is the quantifier variantist committed to metaphysical vagueness? My investigation of this question goes via a study of vague existence. I’ll argue that the quantifier variantist is committed to vague existence and that the vague existence posited by the variantist requires a puzzling sort of metaphysical vagueness. Specifically, I distinguish between (what I call) positive and negative metaphysical vagueness. Positive metaphysic…
Modal normativism on semantic rules
According to Amie Thomasson's modal normativism, the function of modal discourse is to convey semantic rules. But what is a “semantic rule”? I raise three worries according to which there is no conception of a semantic rule that can serve the needs of a modal normativist. The first worry focuses on de re and a posteriori necessities. The second worry concerns Thomasson's inferential specification of the meaning of modal terms. The third worry ask…
Reference Magnetism Beyond the Predicate
Many accept David Lewis's (1983) claim that, among the candidate meanings for our predicates, some are more natural than others—they do better or worse at “carving nature at its joints.” Call this claim predicate naturalism. Disagreement remains over whether the notion of naturalness extends “beyond the predicate'” (à la Sider, 2011). Are the candidate meanings of logical vocabulary also more or less natural? Call this claim logical naturalism. O…
Vagueness, normativity, and inescapable questions
Our concept bald displays all of the features paradigmatic of vagueness. For instance, it is sorites-susceptible. Moreover, the concept allows for cases of a distinctive kind in the middling part of the sorites series – cases for which it seems “there is just no fact of the matter” whether the member is bald. Our concept ought displays some of these same features. For instance, it too is sorites-susceptible. However, there is a difference. The mi…
Epistemology (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Linguistics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Vagueness (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Linguistics and Discourse Analysis (2 works)