Modal normativism on semantic rules
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21335154 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rohan Sud (0000-0001-7542-632X, Virginia Tech, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 67 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 2361-2380 |
| Publication date | 2024-09-13 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2023.2226516 |
| OpenAlex | W4384499922 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 18 |
According to Amie Thomasson's modal normativism, the function of modal discourse is to convey semantic rules. But what is a “semantic rule”? I raise three worries according to which there is no conception of a semantic rule that can serve the needs of a modal normativist. The first worry focuses on de re and a posteriori necessities. The second worry concerns Thomasson's inferential specification of the meaning of modal terms. The third worry asks about the normative status of semantic rules
Epistemology · Linguistics · Meaning (existential) · Modal · Normative · Worry · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Linguistics and Discourse Analysis · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
The Philosophy of Philosophy
A Pragmatic Method for Normative Conceptual Work
Scorekeeping in a language game
What ‘must’ and ‘can’ must and can mean
Meaning and Normativity
On what matters, Volume one
Modalities and intensional languages
Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
Authoritatively Normative Concepts
Oughts and Thoughts
Against quietist normative realism
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |