Troy Seagraves
Biographic Data
| ID | 5969057 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Troy Seagraves |
| GIVEN NAMES | Troy |
| FAMILY NAME | Seagraves |
| SIGNATURE | SEAGRAVES T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Purdue University West Lafayette |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0593-9255 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Permissivism Across Rationality
Permissivisms in both epistemic and practical rationality enjoy support, but they are discussed in strikingly different ways. Epistemic permissivists focus on both intrapersonal and interpersonal cases, finding the latter more popular than the former. In contrast, practical permissivists focus only on intrapersonal cases. This is odd because practical and epistemic rationality are structurally similar. Furthermore, Paul Forrester (2024) argues th…
Self-hatred and shame
This paper argues for an explanation of self-hatred where quintessential cases of self-hatred are caused by shame. Self-hatred (hatred directed at oneself) is distinguished from other-hatred (hatred directed at others). While the latter has enjoyed much attention, the former has enjoyed little. Self-hatred, however, is interestingly different from its other-focused cousin in that other-hatred presupposes a sense of positive self-worth while self-…
Permissivism and intellectual virtue
This paper argues for a permissivism of personal rationality, a rationality concerning the epistemic evaluation of persons. I work from the perspective of virtue epistemology where the standards of evaluation are the intellectual character virtues. On this picture, an agent is personally rational in having a doxastic attitude when having it is the result of some exemplification of an intellectual virtue. Permissive cases arise when the emotional …
The normative significance of God’s self
No prominent works on this page.
The normative significance of God’s self
Permissivism Across Rationality
Permissivisms in both epistemic and practical rationality enjoy support, but they are discussed in strikingly different ways. Epistemic permissivists focus on both intrapersonal and interpersonal cases, finding the latter more popular than the former. In contrast, practical permissivists focus only on intrapersonal cases. This is odd because practical and epistemic rationality are structurally similar. Furthermore, Paul Forrester (2024) argues th…
Self-hatred and shame
This paper argues for an explanation of self-hatred where quintessential cases of self-hatred are caused by shame. Self-hatred (hatred directed at oneself) is distinguished from other-hatred (hatred directed at others). While the latter has enjoyed much attention, the former has enjoyed little. Self-hatred, however, is interestingly different from its other-focused cousin in that other-hatred presupposes a sense of positive self-worth while self-…
Permissivism and intellectual virtue
This paper argues for a permissivism of personal rationality, a rationality concerning the epistemic evaluation of persons. I work from the perspective of virtue epistemology where the standards of evaluation are the intellectual character virtues. On this picture, an agent is personally rational in having a doxastic attitude when having it is the result of some exemplification of an intellectual virtue. Permissive cases arise when the emotional …
Psychology (3 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Rationality (2 works) · Appeal (1 works) · Doxastic logic (1 works) · Early Childhood Education and Development (1 works)