Permissivism Across Rationality

Bibliographic Data

ID21876307
AuthorsTroy Seagraves (0000-0003-0593-9255, Purdue University West Lafayette, corresponding author)
Year2026
Pages1-20
Publication date2026-05-19
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of the American Philosophical Association (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2053-4477 • E-ISSN: 2053-4485
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/apa.2026.10031
OpenAlexW7161627051
LanguageEN
References cited35

Permissivisms in both epistemic and practical rationality enjoy support, but they are discussed in strikingly different ways. Epistemic permissivists focus on both intrapersonal and interpersonal cases, finding the latter more popular than the former. In contrast, practical permissivists focus only on intrapersonal cases. This is odd because practical and epistemic rationality are structurally similar. Furthermore, Paul Forrester (2024) argues that permissivism faces significant explanatory burdens regarding the range of one’s rational options: permissivists need to explain why some cases are permissive and others are not as well as explain why some options are permissible while others are not. I argue that we can meet Forrester’s challenge by appealing to reasons holism, which explains the range of rational options. This appeal also illuminates similarities between practical and epistemic permissivisms, motivating an underappreciated interpersonal practical permissivism

Appeal · Interpersonal communication · Intrapersonal communication · Rational agent · Rationality · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophical Ethics and Theory

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