Gustavo Cevolani
Biographic Data
| ID | 5969863 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gustavo Cevolani |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gustavo |
| FAMILY NAME | Cevolani |
| SIGNATURE | CEVOLANI G |
| AFFILIATIONS | IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8770-8877 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 18 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 29 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 18 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Scrolling to wisdom
The present study explores the effect of exposure to news in a social media environment on people’s perceived knowledge and on the “Illusion of knowledge” —that is, the overestimation of perceived knowledge relative to actual knowledge. Using a mixed, within-subjects design, participants ( N = 828) engaged in a two-session study featuring pre- and post-exposure assessments. Participants scrolled through a social media newsfeed and completed asses…
Truthlikeness and the inclusion fallacy
In this paper, we offer a novel normative analysis of the inclusion fallacy. This refers to the robust tendency of experimental participants to reason about categories in a way that violates the laws of probability. In contrast to the received view, we argue that participants’ preferences in this kind of task might be rationally defended. To this purpose, we employ the philosophical notion of truthlikeness as a normative benchmark for category-ba…
I want to be safe
Vaccine perception is a dynamic process shaped by evolving factors like efficacy and safety perceptions, trust levels, and individual motivations. Our study sheds light on the complex dynamics that underlie the perception of vaccine safety and efficacy, and their impact on willingness to vaccinate. We discuss these results in light of bounded rationality, loss aversion and classic utility theory
Inference to the best neuroscientific explanation
How to Believe Long Conjunctions of Beliefs
According to the so-called Lockean thesis, a rational agent believes a proposition just in case its probability is sufficiently high, i.e., greater than some suitably fixed threshold. The Preface paradox is usually taken to show that the Lockean thesis is untenable, if one also assumes that rational agents should believe the conjunction of their own beliefs: high probability and rational belief are in a sense incompatible. In this paper, we show …
Realism, antirealism, and theoretical conservatism
Defending De-idealization in Economic Modeling
This paper defends the viability of de-idealization strategies in economic modeling against recent criticism. De-idealization occurs when an idealized assumption of a theoretical model is replaced with a more realistic one. Recently, some scholars have raised objections against the possibility or fruitfulness of de-idealizing economic models, suggesting that economists do not employ this kind of strategy. We present a detailed case study from the…
Abductive reasoning in cognitive neuroscience
Approaching probabilistic truths
Approaching deterministic and probabilistic truth
The basic problem of a theory of truth approximation is defining when a theory is “close to the truth” about some relevant domain. Existing accounts of truthlikeness or verisimilitude address this problem, but are usually limited to the problem of approaching a “deterministic” truth by means of deterministic theories. A general theory of truth approximation, however, should arguably cover also cases where either the relevant theories, or “the tru…
Multiple discoveries, inevitability, and scientific realism
A partial consequence account of truthlikeness
Unfolding the Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation
We explore the grammar of Bayesian confirmation by focusing on some likelihood principles, including the Weak Law of Likelihood. We show that none of the likelihood principles proposed so far is satisfied by all incremental measures of confirmation, and we argue that some of these measures indeed obey new, prima facie strange, antilikelihood principles. To prove this, we introduce a new measure that violates the Weak Law of Likelihood while satis…
A systematic companion to “neoclassical” philosophy of science
Truth approximation, belief merging, and peer disagreement
Verisimilitude and belief change for nomic conjunctive theories
Truth may not explain predictive success, but truthlikeness does
“Merely a logician’s toy?” Belief revision confronting scientific theory change
Verisimilitude and belief change for nomic conjunctive theories
A partial consequence account of truthlikeness
Truth approximation, belief merging, and peer disagreement
Abductive reasoning in cognitive neuroscience
Defending De-idealization in Economic Modeling
This paper defends the viability of de-idealization strategies in economic modeling against recent criticism. De-idealization occurs when an idealized assumption of a theoretical model is replaced with a more realistic one. Recently, some scholars have raised objections against the possibility or fruitfulness of de-idealizing economic models, suggesting that economists do not employ this kind of strategy. We present a detailed case study from the…
Approaching probabilistic truths
Multiple discoveries, inevitability, and scientific realism
Unfolding the Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation
We explore the grammar of Bayesian confirmation by focusing on some likelihood principles, including the Weak Law of Likelihood. We show that none of the likelihood principles proposed so far is satisfied by all incremental measures of confirmation, and we argue that some of these measures indeed obey new, prima facie strange, antilikelihood principles. To prove this, we introduce a new measure that violates the Weak Law of Likelihood while satis…
“Merely a logician’s toy?” Belief revision confronting scientific theory change
Verisimilitude and belief change for nomic conjunctive theories
Truth may not explain predictive success, but truthlikeness does
Truth approximation, belief merging, and peer disagreement
A systematic companion to “neoclassical” philosophy of science
Unfolding the Grammar of Bayesian Confirmation
We explore the grammar of Bayesian confirmation by focusing on some likelihood principles, including the Weak Law of Likelihood. We show that none of the likelihood principles proposed so far is satisfied by all incremental measures of confirmation, and we argue that some of these measures indeed obey new, prima facie strange, antilikelihood principles. To prove this, we introduce a new measure that violates the Weak Law of Likelihood while satis…
A partial consequence account of truthlikeness
Approaching deterministic and probabilistic truth
The basic problem of a theory of truth approximation is defining when a theory is “close to the truth” about some relevant domain. Existing accounts of truthlikeness or verisimilitude address this problem, but are usually limited to the problem of approaching a “deterministic” truth by means of deterministic theories. A general theory of truth approximation, however, should arguably cover also cases where either the relevant theories, or “the tru…
Multiple discoveries, inevitability, and scientific realism
Defending De-idealization in Economic Modeling
This paper defends the viability of de-idealization strategies in economic modeling against recent criticism. De-idealization occurs when an idealized assumption of a theoretical model is replaced with a more realistic one. Recently, some scholars have raised objections against the possibility or fruitfulness of de-idealizing economic models, suggesting that economists do not employ this kind of strategy. We present a detailed case study from the…
Abductive reasoning in cognitive neuroscience
Approaching probabilistic truths
How to Believe Long Conjunctions of Beliefs
According to the so-called Lockean thesis, a rational agent believes a proposition just in case its probability is sufficiently high, i.e., greater than some suitably fixed threshold. The Preface paradox is usually taken to show that the Lockean thesis is untenable, if one also assumes that rational agents should believe the conjunction of their own beliefs: high probability and rational belief are in a sense incompatible. In this paper, we show …
Realism, antirealism, and theoretical conservatism
I want to be safe
Vaccine perception is a dynamic process shaped by evolving factors like efficacy and safety perceptions, trust levels, and individual motivations. Our study sheds light on the complex dynamics that underlie the perception of vaccine safety and efficacy, and their impact on willingness to vaccinate. We discuss these results in light of bounded rationality, loss aversion and classic utility theory
Inference to the best neuroscientific explanation
Truthlikeness and the inclusion fallacy
In this paper, we offer a novel normative analysis of the inclusion fallacy. This refers to the robust tendency of experimental participants to reason about categories in a way that violates the laws of probability. In contrast to the received view, we argue that participants’ preferences in this kind of task might be rationally defended. To this purpose, we employ the philosophical notion of truthlikeness as a normative benchmark for category-ba…
Scrolling to wisdom
The present study explores the effect of exposure to news in a social media environment on people’s perceived knowledge and on the “Illusion of knowledge” —that is, the overestimation of perceived knowledge relative to actual knowledge. Using a mixed, within-subjects design, participants ( N = 828) engaged in a two-session study featuring pre- and post-exposure assessments. Participants scrolled through a social media newsfeed and completed asses…
Epistemology (15 works) · Philosophy (15 works) · Philosophy of science (11 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Metaphysics (7 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (7 works) · Philosophy of language (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Mathematics (6 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (5 works)