Eric Johannesson
Biographic Data
| ID | 5969933 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Eric Johannesson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Eric |
| FAMILY NAME | Johannesson |
| SIGNATURE | JOHANNESSON E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Stockholm University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9128-2565 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Quine’s Underdetermination Thesis
In On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World from 1975, Quine formulated a thesis of underdetermination roughly to the effect that every scientific theory has an empirically equivalent but logically incompatible rival, one that cannot be discarded merely as a terminological variant of the former. For Quine, the truth of this thesis was an open question. If true, some would argue that it undermines any belief in scientific theories that is ba…
The Statistical Riddle of Induction
With his new riddle of induction, Goodman raised a problem for enumerative induction which many have taken to show that only some ‘natural’ properties can be used for making inductive inferences. Arguably, however, (i) enumerative induction is not a method that scientists use for making inductive inferences in the first place. Moreover, it seems at first sight that (ii) Goodman’s problem does not affect the method that scientists actually use for…
On the indispensability of theoretical terms and entities
Some realists claim that theoretical entities like numbers and electrons are indispensable for describing the empirical world. Motivated by the meta-ontology of Quine, I take this claim to imply that, for some first-order theory T and formula $$\delta (x)$$ δ ( x ) such that $$T \vdash \exists x \delta \wedge \exists x \lnot \delta $$ T ⊢ ∃ x δ ∧ ∃ x ¬ δ , where $$\delta (x)$$ δ ( x ) is intended to apply to all and only empirical entities, there…
Classical versus Bayesian Statistics
In statistics, there are two main paradigms: classical and Bayesian statistics. The purpose of this article is to investigate the extent to which classicists and Bayesians can (in some suitable sense of the word) agree. My conclusion is that, in certain situations, they cannot. The upshot is that, if we assume that the classicist is not allowed to have a higher degree of belief (credence) in a null hypothesis after he has rejected it than before,…
No prominent works on this page.
Classical versus Bayesian Statistics
In statistics, there are two main paradigms: classical and Bayesian statistics. The purpose of this article is to investigate the extent to which classicists and Bayesians can (in some suitable sense of the word) agree. My conclusion is that, in certain situations, they cannot. The upshot is that, if we assume that the classicist is not allowed to have a higher degree of belief (credence) in a null hypothesis after he has rejected it than before,…
On the indispensability of theoretical terms and entities
Some realists claim that theoretical entities like numbers and electrons are indispensable for describing the empirical world. Motivated by the meta-ontology of Quine, I take this claim to imply that, for some first-order theory T and formula $$\delta (x)$$ δ ( x ) such that $$T \vdash \exists x \delta \wedge \exists x \lnot \delta $$ T ⊢ ∃ x δ ∧ ∃ x ¬ δ , where $$\delta (x)$$ δ ( x ) is intended to apply to all and only empirical entities, there…
The Statistical Riddle of Induction
With his new riddle of induction, Goodman raised a problem for enumerative induction which many have taken to show that only some ‘natural’ properties can be used for making inductive inferences. Arguably, however, (i) enumerative induction is not a method that scientists use for making inductive inferences in the first place. Moreover, it seems at first sight that (ii) Goodman’s problem does not affect the method that scientists actually use for…
Quine’s Underdetermination Thesis
In On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World from 1975, Quine formulated a thesis of underdetermination roughly to the effect that every scientific theory has an empirically equivalent but logically incompatible rival, one that cannot be discarded merely as a terminological variant of the former. For Quine, the truth of this thesis was an open question. If true, some would argue that it undermines any belief in scientific theories that is ba…
Philosophy and History of Science (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Advanced Topology and Set Theory (1 work) · Algorithm (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work)