The Statistical Riddle of Induction

Bibliographic Data

ID21293427
AuthorsEric Johannesson (0000-0001-9128-2565, Stockholm University, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume101
Issue2
Pages313-326
Publication date2023-04-03
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2021.2013909
OpenAlexW4205666426
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited15

With his new riddle of induction, Goodman raised a problem for enumerative induction which many have taken to show that only some ‘natural’ properties can be used for making inductive inferences. Arguably, however, (i) enumerative induction is not a method that scientists use for making inductive inferences in the first place. Moreover, it seems at first sight that (ii) Goodman’s problem does not affect the method that scientists actually use for making such inferences—namely, classical statistics. Taken together, this would indicate that (iii) ‘naturalness’ is not such a relevant concept for the problem of induction, after all. I have no objections against (i) and (iii). But, contrary to (ii), I argue that classical statistics does face a version of Goodman’s problem, which I call the statistical riddle of induction. Given that his problem merely is an instance of the more general problem of underdetermination, this is hardly surprising. Perhaps more importantly, I also show how my riddle can be used for exposing a common fallacy in probabilistic reasoning, without relying on Bayesian assumptions

Epistemology · Fallacy · Inductive reasoning · Mathematical economics · Natural (archaeology) · Naturalness · Physics · Probabilistic logic · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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