Roman Heil
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995134 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Roman Heil |
| GIVEN NAMES | Roman |
| FAMILY NAME | Heil |
| SIGNATURE | HEIL R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Goethe University Frankfurt |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6557-2171 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
A Match Made in (Rational) Heaven? How Credences Relate to Probability Beliefs
Much has been said about the relation between credences and beliefs. Surprisingly little, however, has been said about how credences more specifically relate to probability beliefs. In this paper, I will argue that they are normatively related. This proposal goes against belief‐first reductionism, which says that credences just are probability beliefs. Against the most popular version of this view, I will offer a novel counterexample in which int…
How to act on what you know
That we may rely on our knowledge seems like a platitude. Yet, the view that knowledge is sufficient for permissible reliance faces a major challenge: when much hangs on whether we know, relying on our knowledge seems to license irrational action. Unfortunately, extant proposals to meet this challenge (Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008; Williamson, 2005a; Schulz, 2017, 2021b) either fail to make the correct predictions about high-stakes cases or, as I wi…
Knowledge and decision
No prominent works on this page.
Knowledge and decision
How to act on what you know
That we may rely on our knowledge seems like a platitude. Yet, the view that knowledge is sufficient for permissible reliance faces a major challenge: when much hangs on whether we know, relying on our knowledge seems to license irrational action. Unfortunately, extant proposals to meet this challenge (Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008; Williamson, 2005a; Schulz, 2017, 2021b) either fail to make the correct predictions about high-stakes cases or, as I wi…
A Match Made in (Rational) Heaven? How Credences Relate to Probability Beliefs
Much has been said about the relation between credences and beliefs. Surprisingly little, however, has been said about how credences more specifically relate to probability beliefs. In this paper, I will argue that they are normatively related. This proposal goes against belief‐first reductionism, which says that credences just are probability beliefs. Against the most popular version of this view, I will offer a novel counterexample in which int…
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Philosophy of science (2 works) · Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Counterexample (1 works)