How to act on what you know
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10806399 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Roman Heil (0000-0001-6557-2171, Goethe University Frankfurt, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 203 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Publication date | 2024-06-04 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-024-04628-6 |
| OpenAlex | W4399321840 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 72 |
That we may rely on our knowledge seems like a platitude. Yet, the view that knowledge is sufficient for permissible reliance faces a major challenge: when much hangs on whether we know, relying on our knowledge seems to license irrational action. Unfortunately, extant proposals to meet this challenge (Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008; Williamson, 2005a; Schulz, 2017, 2021b) either fail to make the correct predictions about high-stakes cases or, as I will argue, face a substantial objection. In this paper, I will offer two novel proposals for defending the sufficiency of knowledge for permissible reliance. My favoured proposal, which I call Flexible Fallibilism, is based on the idea that stakes can affect how we rely on our knowledge and how our knowledge determines what is rational for us to do. Besides making the correct predictions about high-stakes cases, I will argue that Flexible Fallibilism also provides us with a knowledge-based account of when to simplify our practical reasoning. Afterwards, I will present another proposal, which I call Dual Infallibilism, that combines two recent claims by Moss (2013, 2018) and Jackson (2019a) about credal knowledge and the metaphysics of doxastic states. While the offered proposals share various virtues, I will argue that we ultimately should prefer Flexible Fallibilism
Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychological and Educational Research Studies
Assertion
Knowledge and Practical Interests
Knowledge in an Uncertain World
The Importance of Being Rational
Knowledge and Action
Deciding to trust, coming to believe
Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action
Credence
Partial Reliance
Foundations for Knowledge-Based Decision Theories
Elusive knowledge
Warrant and action
Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief
Knowledge and reasoning
Clarity about concessive knowledge attributions
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification
Epistemology Normalized
Epistemology Formalized
Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge
On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology
Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions
Easy Possibilities
Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief
Interest‐Relative Invariantism
Précis of Knowledge in an Uncertain World
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment 1
Replies to Commentators
Probability Kinematics
Certainty in Action
How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment
Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |