Julian Fink
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995226 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Julian Fink |
| GIVEN NAMES | Julian |
| FAMILY NAME | Fink |
| SIGNATURE | FINK J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Bayreuth |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3436-7332 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Structural Irrationality Does Not Consist in Having Attitudes You Ought Not to Have
This paper presents a new argument against the view that structural (or attitude-based) irrationality consists in failing to respond correctly to normative reasons. According to this view, a pattern of attitudes is structurally irrational if and only if that pattern guarantees that one has at least one attitude one ought not to have. I argue that this ought-violation view comes with three indispensable theoretical commitments. These commitments c…
The Essence of Structural Irrationality
The phenomenon of "structural irrationality" covers a diverse range of combinations of attitudes, including (inter alia) contradictory beliefs, contradictory intentions, means–end incoherence, akratic incoherence, and cyclical preferences. This paper offers a novel, unified account of when a pattern of attitudes qualifies as structurally irrational. It begins by setting up the core of the view I will be defending: a set of attitudes is irrational…
The varying rationality of weakness of the will
Weakness of the will remains a perplexing issue. Though philosophers have made substantial progress in homing in on what counts as a weak will, there is little agreement on whether weakness of the will is irrational, and if so, why. In this paper, we take an empirical approach towards the rationality of weakness of the will. After introducing the philosophical debate, we present the results of an empirical study that reveals that people take a “d…
The Morality of Price/Quality and Ethical Consumerism
A Symposium on Nazi Law
Is the Right prior to the Good
One popular line of argument put forward in support of the principle that the right is prior to the good is to show that teleological theories, which put the good prior to the right, lead to implausible normative results. There are situations, it is argued, in which putting the good prior to the right entails that we ought to do things that cannot be right for us to do. Consequently, goodness cannot (always) explain an action’s rightness. This in…
No prominent works on this page.
Is the Right prior to the Good
One popular line of argument put forward in support of the principle that the right is prior to the good is to show that teleological theories, which put the good prior to the right, lead to implausible normative results. There are situations, it is argued, in which putting the good prior to the right entails that we ought to do things that cannot be right for us to do. Consequently, goodness cannot (always) explain an action’s rightness. This in…
A Symposium on Nazi Law
The Morality of Price/Quality and Ethical Consumerism
The varying rationality of weakness of the will
Weakness of the will remains a perplexing issue. Though philosophers have made substantial progress in homing in on what counts as a weak will, there is little agreement on whether weakness of the will is irrational, and if so, why. In this paper, we take an empirical approach towards the rationality of weakness of the will. After introducing the philosophical debate, we present the results of an empirical study that reveals that people take a “d…
The Essence of Structural Irrationality
The phenomenon of "structural irrationality" covers a diverse range of combinations of attitudes, including (inter alia) contradictory beliefs, contradictory intentions, means–end incoherence, akratic incoherence, and cyclical preferences. This paper offers a novel, unified account of when a pattern of attitudes qualifies as structurally irrational. It begins by setting up the core of the view I will be defending: a set of attitudes is irrational…
Structural Irrationality Does Not Consist in Having Attitudes You Ought Not to Have
This paper presents a new argument against the view that structural (or attitude-based) irrationality consists in failing to respond correctly to normative reasons. According to this view, a pattern of attitudes is structurally irrational if and only if that pattern guarantees that one has at least one attitude one ought not to have. I argue that this ought-violation view comes with three indispensable theoretical commitments. These commitments c…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Positive economics (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Rationality (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works)