Structural Irrationality Does Not Consist in Having Attitudes You Ought Not to Have
A New Dilemma for Reasons-Violating Structural Irrationality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21293457 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Julian Fink (0000-0002-3436-7332, University of Bayreuth, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 103 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 416-432 |
| Publication date | 2025-04-03 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2024.2389554 |
| OpenAlex | W4402347387 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 23 |
This paper presents a new argument against the view that structural (or attitude-based) irrationality consists in failing to respond correctly to normative reasons. According to this view, a pattern of attitudes is structurally irrational if and only if that pattern guarantees that one has at least one attitude one ought not to have. I argue that this ought-violation view comes with three indispensable theoretical commitments. These commitments concern various relationships between normative permissions and oughts that govern beliefs and intentions, and they may appear plausible when viewed in isolation. However, once they are collectively conjoined, they imply oughts that are incompatible with the ought-violation view of structural irrationality. In particular, on the ought-violation view, these oughts entail that you are necessarily structurally irrational whenever [you intend to p] and [you believe that it is not the case that you ought to p]. However, since you can rationally intend things that you believe to be normatively optional (for example, merely permitted or supererogatory actions), the ought-violation view faces the following dilemma: it must either deny one of its essential commitments or accept as irrational a set of attitudes that are clearly not. Either way suffices to show that the ought-violation view cannot serve as a correct analysis of structural irrationality
Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Irrationality · Positive economics · Rationality · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
The Importance of Being Rational
Why Be Rational?
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity
Rationality Through Reasoning
Which Reason? Which Rationality
Error, consistency and triviality
The Essence of Structural Irrationality
The independence of (in)coherence
The Normativity of Rationality
You ought to φ only if you may believe that you ought to φ
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |