Anna Giustina
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995239 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anna Giustina |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anna |
| FAMILY NAME | Giustina |
| SIGNATURE | GIUSTINA A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Liège |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9014-6833 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Nature Does Not Yet Say No to Inner Awareness: Reply to Stoljar
Inner awareness: The argument from attention
We present a new argument in favor of the Awareness Principle, the principle that one is always aware of one’s concurrent conscious states. Informally, the argument is this: (1) Your conscious states are such that you can attend to them without undertaking any action beyond mere shift of attention ; but (2) You cannot come to attend to something without undertaking any action beyond mere shift of attention unless you are already aware of that thi…
Introspective acquaintance: An integration account
In this paper, I develop a new version of the acquaintance view of the nature of introspection of phenomenal states. On the acquaintance view, when one introspects a current phenomenal state of one's, one bears to it the relation of introspective acquaintance. Extant versions of the acquaintance view neglect what I call the phenomenal modification problem . The problem, articulated by Franz Brentano in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint …
A Defense of Inner Awareness: The Memory Argument Revisited
Introspection of Emotions
We argue that knowledge of emotions essentially depends on introspecting the phenomenology of emotional experiences and that introspection of emotional experiences is a process by stages, where the most fundamental stage is a non‐classificatory introspective state. We call such a non‐classificatory kind of introspection primitive introspection . We aim to show that, although not sufficient, primitive introspection is a necessary ground to acquire…
An Acquaintance alternative to Self-Representationalism
Introspective knowledge by acquaintance
Varieties of Self-Apprehension
The Brentanian idea that every state of consciousness involves a consciousness or awareness of itself (Brentano 1874), which has been a central tenet of the phenomenological school, is a current topic in contemporary philosophical debates about consciousness and subjectivity, both in the continental and the analytic tradition. Typically, the self-awareness that accompanies every state of consciousness is characterized as pre-reflective. Most the…
Introspection Without Judgment
Varieties of Self-Apprehension
The Brentanian idea that every state of consciousness involves a consciousness or awareness of itself (Brentano 1874), which has been a central tenet of the phenomenological school, is a current topic in contemporary philosophical debates about consciousness and subjectivity, both in the continental and the analytic tradition. Typically, the self-awareness that accompanies every state of consciousness is characterized as pre-reflective. Most the…
Introspection Without Judgment
A Defense of Inner Awareness: The Memory Argument Revisited
Introspection of Emotions
We argue that knowledge of emotions essentially depends on introspecting the phenomenology of emotional experiences and that introspection of emotional experiences is a process by stages, where the most fundamental stage is a non‐classificatory introspective state. We call such a non‐classificatory kind of introspection primitive introspection . We aim to show that, although not sufficient, primitive introspection is a necessary ground to acquire…
An Acquaintance alternative to Self-Representationalism
Introspective knowledge by acquaintance
Introspective acquaintance: An integration account
In this paper, I develop a new version of the acquaintance view of the nature of introspection of phenomenal states. On the acquaintance view, when one introspects a current phenomenal state of one's, one bears to it the relation of introspective acquaintance. Extant versions of the acquaintance view neglect what I call the phenomenal modification problem . The problem, articulated by Franz Brentano in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint …
Nature Does Not Yet Say No to Inner Awareness: Reply to Stoljar
Inner awareness: The argument from attention
We present a new argument in favor of the Awareness Principle, the principle that one is always aware of one’s concurrent conscious states. Informally, the argument is this: (1) Your conscious states are such that you can attend to them without undertaking any action beyond mere shift of attention ; but (2) You cannot come to attend to something without undertaking any action beyond mere shift of attention unless you are already aware of that thi…
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Psychology (9 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Consciousness (7 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Introspection (5 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy of mind (5 works)