Introspective acquaintance

An integration account

Bibliographic Data

ID21603299
AuthorsAnna Giustina (0000-0002-9014-6833, Department of Philosophy University of Liège Liège Belgium, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume31
Issue2
Pages380-397
Publication date2023-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ejop.12690
OpenAlexW3206376754
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited44

In this paper, I develop a new version of the acquaintance view of the nature of introspection of phenomenal states. On the acquaintance view, when one introspects a current phenomenal state of one's, one bears to it the relation of introspective acquaintance. Extant versions of the acquaintance view neglect what I call the phenomenal modification problem . The problem, articulated by Franz Brentano in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint , is that drawing introspective attention to one's current conscious experience may modify its phenomenology. Failing to take phenomenal modification into account affects the adequacy of extant versions of the acquaintance view. The purpose of this paper is to develop a better version, the integration account , that meets the phenomenal modification challenge while preserving the merits of other versions

Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Empirical research · Epistemology · Extant taxon · Introspection · Neglect · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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