Erhan Demircioglu
Biographic Data
| ID | 5995496 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Erhan Demircioglu |
| GIVEN NAMES | Erhan |
| FAMILY NAME | Demircioglu |
| SIGNATURE | DEMIRCIOGLU E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Koç University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1579-7505 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Begging the Question in the Chinese Room
In this paper, I argue that the Chinese Room Argument, famously offered by John Searle, is not compelling: either, contrary to Searle’s intention, it is a colorful illustration that machines with the right programs have some genuine cognition, or it does nothing more than insisting without any persuasive force that there must be something wrong with Strong Artificial Intelligence
Reliabilism, the Generality Problem, and the Basing Relation
In “A Well‐Founded Solution to the Generality Problem”, Comesaña argues, inter alia , for three main claims. One is what I call the unavoidability claim : Any adequate epistemological theory needs to appeal, either implicitly or explicitly, to the notion of a belief's being based on certain evidence. Another is what I call the legitimacy claim : It is perfectly legitimate to appeal to the basing relation in solving a problem for an epistemologica…
Epistemic infinitism and the conditional character of inferential justification
Dretske on Non‐Epistemic Seeing
In this article, I make a distinction between two versions of non‐epistemicism about seeing, and bring explicitly into view and argue against a particular version defended by Dretske. More specifically, I distinguish non‐epistemic seeing as non‐conceptual seeing, where concept possession is assumed to be cognitively demanding, from non‐epistemic seeing as seeing without noticing, where noticing is assumed to be relatively cognitively undemanding.…
The given in perceptual experience
No prominent works on this page.
The given in perceptual experience
Dretske on Non‐Epistemic Seeing
In this article, I make a distinction between two versions of non‐epistemicism about seeing, and bring explicitly into view and argue against a particular version defended by Dretske. More specifically, I distinguish non‐epistemic seeing as non‐conceptual seeing, where concept possession is assumed to be cognitively demanding, from non‐epistemic seeing as seeing without noticing, where noticing is assumed to be relatively cognitively undemanding.…
Epistemic infinitism and the conditional character of inferential justification
Reliabilism, the Generality Problem, and the Basing Relation
In “A Well‐Founded Solution to the Generality Problem”, Comesaña argues, inter alia , for three main claims. One is what I call the unavoidability claim : Any adequate epistemological theory needs to appeal, either implicitly or explicitly, to the notion of a belief's being based on certain evidence. Another is what I call the legitimacy claim : It is perfectly legitimate to appeal to the basing relation in solving a problem for an epistemologica…
Begging the Question in the Chinese Room
In this paper, I argue that the Chinese Room Argument, famously offered by John Searle, is not compelling: either, contrary to Searle’s intention, it is a colorful illustration that machines with the right programs have some genuine cognition, or it does nothing more than insisting without any persuasive force that there must be something wrong with Strong Artificial Intelligence
Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Law (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works)