Reliabilism, the Generality Problem, and the Basing Relation

Bibliographic Data

ID20142908
AuthorsErhan Demircioglu (0000-0002-1579-7505, Koç University, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume85
Issue2
Pages119-144
Publication date2019-04-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12180
OpenAlexW2916758264
LanguageEN
References cited31

In “A Well‐Founded Solution to the Generality Problem”, Comesaña argues, inter alia , for three main claims. One is what I call the unavoidability claim : Any adequate epistemological theory needs to appeal, either implicitly or explicitly, to the notion of a belief's being based on certain evidence. Another is what I call the legitimacy claim : It is perfectly legitimate to appeal to the basing relation in solving a problem for an epistemological theory. According to Comesaña, the legitimacy claim follows straightforwardly from the unavoidability claim. The third is what I call the basing solution claim : An appeal to the notion of basing relation is all we need to solve the generality problem for (process) reliabilism. In this article, I argue that the unavoidability claim and the basing solution claim are false and that the legitimacy claim might be true only in a qualified sense

Appeal · Economics · Epistemology · Generality · Legitimacy · Management · Political science · Relation (database) · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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