Benjamin T Rancourt
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996209 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Benjamin T Rancourt |
| GIVEN NAMES | Benjamin T |
| FAMILY NAME | Rancourt |
| SIGNATURE | RANCOURT B T |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Massachusetts Amherst |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The virtue of ignorance
The thesis defended in this article is that epistemology should treat some of our cognitive limitations not as unfortunate defects or external perturbations to be idealized away in theories of epistemic agency, but as necessary underpinnings of good reasoning. We begin with a problem regarding deliberation that calls epistemic agency into question: our reasons in support of belief are never conclusive and never rule out all doubt. Yet we must rul…
Epistemic relativism and semantic blindness
Egoism or the problem of evil
Sceptical theists undermine the argument from evil by claiming that our ability to distinguish between justified and unjustified evil is weak enough that we must take seriously the possibility that all evil is justified. However, I argue that this claim leads to a dilemma: either our judgements regarding unjustified evil are reliable enough that the problem of evil remains a problem, or our judgements regarding unjustified evil are so unreliable …
No prominent works on this page.
Egoism or the problem of evil
Sceptical theists undermine the argument from evil by claiming that our ability to distinguish between justified and unjustified evil is weak enough that we must take seriously the possibility that all evil is justified. However, I argue that this claim leads to a dilemma: either our judgements regarding unjustified evil are reliable enough that the problem of evil remains a problem, or our judgements regarding unjustified evil are so unreliable …
Epistemic relativism and semantic blindness
The virtue of ignorance
The thesis defended in this article is that epistemology should treat some of our cognitive limitations not as unfortunate defects or external perturbations to be idealized away in theories of epistemic agency, but as necessary underpinnings of good reasoning. We begin with a problem regarding deliberation that calls epistemic agency into question: our reasons in support of belief are never conclusive and never rule out all doubt. Yet we must rul…
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Agency (philosophy) (1 work) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work) · Blindness (1 work) · Cognition (1 work) · Cognitive science (1 work) · Dilemma (1 work)