Egoism or the problem of evil
A dilemma for sceptical theism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20312652 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Benjamin T Rancourt (Amherst College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 313-325 |
| Publication date | 2013-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412512000297 |
| OpenAlex | W2137745942 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 11 |
Sceptical theists undermine the argument from evil by claiming that our ability to distinguish between justified and unjustified evil is weak enough that we must take seriously the possibility that all evil is justified. However, I argue that this claim leads to a dilemma: either our judgements regarding unjustified evil are reliable enough that the problem of evil remains a problem, or our judgements regarding unjustified evil are so unreliable that it would be misguided to use them in our decision-making. The first horn undermines theism, while the second undermines our moral decision-making. Thus, sceptical theism is problematic
Argument (complex analysis) · Dilemma · Epistemology · Ethical egoism · Moral evil · Problem of Evil · Skepticism · Theism · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |