Hannah Pillin
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996383 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Hannah Pillin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Hannah |
| FAMILY NAME | Pillin |
| SIGNATURE | PILLIN H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Munich School of Philosophy |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7543-7926 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The preface paradox and fragmented justification
This paper presents a new solution to the preface paradox (Makinson, 1965). It makes use of a fragmented account of justification, and thus, unlike existing solutions, employs the central concept involved in the paradox—justification. First, I present the original paradox, and recall a prominent family of solutions to it—solutions that make use of fragmentation accounts of belief. I argue that, while fragmented belief solutions go in the right di…
Fragmented justification
This article presents a fragmented account of justification. The account is motivated via an example from climate science where, within the IPCC assessment report for climate change, an overall inconsistent set of justified beliefs seems to be asserted. The main reason why this happens will be the extreme uncertainty involved in learning about complex systems such as the climate. The article explains how the toolkit of traditional epistemology is…
No prominent works on this page.
Fragmented justification
This article presents a fragmented account of justification. The account is motivated via an example from climate science where, within the IPCC assessment report for climate change, an overall inconsistent set of justified beliefs seems to be asserted. The main reason why this happens will be the extreme uncertainty involved in learning about complex systems such as the climate. The article explains how the toolkit of traditional epistemology is…
The preface paradox and fragmented justification
This paper presents a new solution to the preface paradox (Makinson, 1965). It makes use of a fragmented account of justification, and thus, unlike existing solutions, employs the central concept involved in the paradox—justification. First, I present the original paradox, and recall a prominent family of solutions to it—solutions that make use of fragmentation accounts of belief. I argue that, while fragmented belief solutions go in the right di…
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Philosophy of science (2 works) · Epistemology (1 work) · Fragmentation (computing) (1 work) · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation (1 work) · Philosophy (1 work) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (1 work)