The preface paradox and fragmented justification
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21370958 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hannah Pillin (0000-0001-7543-7926, Munich School of Philosophy, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 183 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 1555-1575 |
| Publication date | 2026-05-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-026-02507-z |
| OpenAlex | W7131651346 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 27 |
This paper presents a new solution to the preface paradox (Makinson, 1965). It makes use of a fragmented account of justification, and thus, unlike existing solutions, employs the central concept involved in the paradox—justification. First, I present the original paradox, and recall a prominent family of solutions to it—solutions that make use of fragmentation accounts of belief. I argue that, while fragmented belief solutions go in the right direction, what does the work in this paradox is not belief but justification. I then present my account of fragmented justification. I show how it solves the preface paradox in a novel way and I provide reasons for why it is a good solution. The upshot of my account of fragmented justification is that the justification relations that hold between pieces of evidence and the propositions they justify are fragment-relative
Fragmentation (computing) · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Recall · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
The Construction of Logical Space
The Stability of Belief
Belief and Acceptance
The paradox of the preface
The Modularity of Mind
Two modellings for theory change
Context-sensitivity and the Preface Paradox for credence
Once you think you’re wrong, you must be right
Rationality and the structure of human memory
Fragmented justification
Iteration and Fragmentation
Main Trends in Recent Philosophy
A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare
A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability
| Highly cited | No |
|---|