Simon Thunder
Biographic Data
| ID | 5996730 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Simon Thunder |
| GIVEN NAMES | Simon |
| FAMILY NAME | Thunder |
| SIGNATURE | THUNDER S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4211-1369 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Parsimony and internal complexity
I argue in favour of a novel conception of ontological parsimony. According to this novel conception, ontological parsimony qua theoretical virtue should not be measured solely by the number of entities (or kinds of entities, or fundamental kinds of entities) posited, but also by the internal complexity of those entities. I argue for this claim via the familiar methodology of appealing to intuitions about particular cases and to observations abou…
Two Physicalist Arguments for Microphysical Manyism
I here defend microphysical manyism. According to microphysical manyism, each composite or higher-level object is a mere plurality of microphysical particles. After clarifying the commitments of the view, I offer two physicalist-friendly arguments in its favour. The first argument appeals to the Canberra Plan. Here I argue that microphysical particles acting in unison play the theoretical roles associated with composite objects - that they do eve…
Manyism as mereologicism
Mereological Nihilism and Material Constitution
Mereological nihilists typically employ a paraphrase strategy in order to mitigate the apparent absurdity of their denial of the existence of composite objects. I argue here that the nihilist's paraphrase strategy is incomplete, because no schema for generating nihilistically acceptable paraphrases of sentences concerning material constitution has ever been given. Nor can an adequate schema be arrived at by generalising things that nihilists have…
There is no reason to replace the Razor with the Laser
In recent times it has become common to encounter philosophers who recommend the replacement of one principle concerning theory choice, Ockham’s Razor, with another: the Laser. Whilst the Razor tells us not to multiply entities beyond necessity, the Laser tells us only to avoid multiplying fundamental entities beyond necessity. There appear to be seven arguments in the literature for the Laser. They divide into three categories: arguments from th…
There is no reason to replace the Razor with the Laser
In recent times it has become common to encounter philosophers who recommend the replacement of one principle concerning theory choice, Ockham’s Razor, with another: the Laser. Whilst the Razor tells us not to multiply entities beyond necessity, the Laser tells us only to avoid multiplying fundamental entities beyond necessity. There appear to be seven arguments in the literature for the Laser. They divide into three categories: arguments from th…
There is no reason to replace the Razor with the Laser
In recent times it has become common to encounter philosophers who recommend the replacement of one principle concerning theory choice, Ockham’s Razor, with another: the Laser. Whilst the Razor tells us not to multiply entities beyond necessity, the Laser tells us only to avoid multiplying fundamental entities beyond necessity. There appear to be seven arguments in the literature for the Laser. They divide into three categories: arguments from th…
Mereological Nihilism and Material Constitution
Mereological nihilists typically employ a paraphrase strategy in order to mitigate the apparent absurdity of their denial of the existence of composite objects. I argue here that the nihilist's paraphrase strategy is incomplete, because no schema for generating nihilistically acceptable paraphrases of sentences concerning material constitution has ever been given. Nor can an adequate schema be arrived at by generalising things that nihilists have…
Two Physicalist Arguments for Microphysical Manyism
I here defend microphysical manyism. According to microphysical manyism, each composite or higher-level object is a mere plurality of microphysical particles. After clarifying the commitments of the view, I offer two physicalist-friendly arguments in its favour. The first argument appeals to the Canberra Plan. Here I argue that microphysical particles acting in unison play the theoretical roles associated with composite objects - that they do eve…
Manyism as mereologicism
Parsimony and internal complexity
I argue in favour of a novel conception of ontological parsimony. According to this novel conception, ontological parsimony qua theoretical virtue should not be measured solely by the number of entities (or kinds of entities, or fundamental kinds of entities) posited, but also by the internal complexity of those entities. I argue for this claim via the familiar methodology of appealing to intuitions about particular cases and to observations abou…
Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works) · Law (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Analogy (1 works)