Maria Sekatskaya
Biographic Data
| ID | 5997129 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Maria Sekatskaya |
| GIVEN NAMES | Maria |
| FAMILY NAME | Sekatskaya |
| SIGNATURE | SEKATSKAYA M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5381-2913 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Probabilistic supervenience and agential possibilities
Compatibilist libertarianism proposes a new solution to the problem of an apparent incompatibility of free will and determinism. It drives a wedge between ontological levels and claims that free will is possible as a higher-level phenomenon even if the fundamental physical level is governed by determinism. After highlighting an inconsistency in the current version of compatibilist libertarianism, we discuss how one of its essential metaphysical a…
Reductionism, Supervenience, and Carnap’s Account of Empirical Confirmability
Rudolf Carnap was one of the earliest proponents of logical positivism/empiricism to explicitly discuss reductionism in relation to mental phenomena from a philosophy of science perspective. In order to address early criticism, Carnap’s account underwent several modifications. An important feature of the ‘mental-to-physical’ reduction endorsed by the later Carnap is that of empirical confirmability. According to this feature, a reduction can only…
Supervenient fixity and agential possibilities
One of the central problems within the free will debate lies in the apparent incompatibility of an agent's ability to do otherwise and determinism. Recently, compatibilist libertarianism was proposed as an actualist position intended to finally reconcile both. In this article, we argue that in order to maintain consistency, this position must be understood as a variant of classical compatibilism rather than a version of libertarianism. Though thi…
Mental causation, interventionism, and probabilistic supervenience
Mental causation is notoriously threatened by the causal exclusion argument. A prominent strategy to save mental causation from causal exclusion consists in subscribing to an interventionist account of causation. This move has, however, recently been challenged by several authors. In this paper, we do two things: We (i) develop what we consider to be the strongest version of the interventionist causal exclusion argument currently on the market an…
Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective
Strong notions of free will are closely connected to the possibility to do otherwise as well as to an agent’s ability to causally influence her environment via her decisions controlling her actions. In this paper we employ techniques from the causal modeling literature to investigate whether a notion of free will subscribing to one or both of these requirements is compatible with naturalistic views of the world such as non-reductive physicalism t…
Moral aspects of compatibilism
Most participants in the current free will debate do not believe that the thesis of physical determinism is true in the actual world. Regardless of this fact, compatibilists keep arguing that free will is compatible with physical determinism, and incompatibilists keep challenging this claim. In the first and second section of this paper, I show that the compatibility of free will with physical determinism is mainly discussed as a means to clari…
Conditional analysis of free will and consequence argument
The conditional analysis of the meaning of the phrase “free will” is a classical compatibilist strategy, first introduced by David Hume and still widely used by compatibilists. The consequence argument is an influential argument against compatibilism. If the consequence argument is sound, then physical determinism is incompatible with alternative possibilities for any agent. In this article, I consider the relationship between the consequence arg…
Metaphysical aspects of diachronic personal identity
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The philosophical significance of Benjamin Libet’s free will experiments
В статье анализируется значение экспериментов Б. Либета для исследования проблемы свободы воли в современной аналитической философии. Кратко излагаются эксперименты Либета, направленные на выявление момента осознания агентом принятия осознанного решения об осуществлении произвольного движения. Рассматриваются аргументы, на основании которых Либет заключает, что полученные им экспериментальные данные свидетельствуют о невозможности сознательной…
Narrative identity and the problem of duplication
Одним из существенных возражений сторонников физического критерия сторон
A Compatibilist Refutation of the 'Four Case' Manipulation Argument
No prominent works on this page.
Narrative identity and the problem of duplication
Одним из существенных возражений сторонников физического критерия сторон
A Compatibilist Refutation of the 'Four Case' Manipulation Argument
Conditional analysis of free will and consequence argument
The conditional analysis of the meaning of the phrase “free will” is a classical compatibilist strategy, first introduced by David Hume and still widely used by compatibilists. The consequence argument is an influential argument against compatibilism. If the consequence argument is sound, then physical determinism is incompatible with alternative possibilities for any agent. In this article, I consider the relationship between the consequence arg…
Metaphysical aspects of diachronic personal identity
, . , , , , . , ,
The philosophical significance of Benjamin Libet’s free will experiments
В статье анализируется значение экспериментов Б. Либета для исследования проблемы свободы воли в современной аналитической философии. Кратко излагаются эксперименты Либета, направленные на выявление момента осознания агентом принятия осознанного решения об осуществлении произвольного движения. Рассматриваются аргументы, на основании которых Либет заключает, что полученные им экспериментальные данные свидетельствуют о невозможности сознательной…
Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective
Strong notions of free will are closely connected to the possibility to do otherwise as well as to an agent’s ability to causally influence her environment via her decisions controlling her actions. In this paper we employ techniques from the causal modeling literature to investigate whether a notion of free will subscribing to one or both of these requirements is compatible with naturalistic views of the world such as non-reductive physicalism t…
Moral aspects of compatibilism
Most participants in the current free will debate do not believe that the thesis of physical determinism is true in the actual world. Regardless of this fact, compatibilists keep arguing that free will is compatible with physical determinism, and incompatibilists keep challenging this claim. In the first and second section of this paper, I show that the compatibility of free will with physical determinism is mainly discussed as a means to clari…
Supervenient fixity and agential possibilities
One of the central problems within the free will debate lies in the apparent incompatibility of an agent's ability to do otherwise and determinism. Recently, compatibilist libertarianism was proposed as an actualist position intended to finally reconcile both. In this article, we argue that in order to maintain consistency, this position must be understood as a variant of classical compatibilism rather than a version of libertarianism. Though thi…
Mental causation, interventionism, and probabilistic supervenience
Mental causation is notoriously threatened by the causal exclusion argument. A prominent strategy to save mental causation from causal exclusion consists in subscribing to an interventionist account of causation. This move has, however, recently been challenged by several authors. In this paper, we do two things: We (i) develop what we consider to be the strongest version of the interventionist causal exclusion argument currently on the market an…
Probabilistic supervenience and agential possibilities
Compatibilist libertarianism proposes a new solution to the problem of an apparent incompatibility of free will and determinism. It drives a wedge between ontological levels and claims that free will is possible as a higher-level phenomenon even if the fundamental physical level is governed by determinism. After highlighting an inconsistency in the current version of compatibilist libertarianism, we discuss how one of its essential metaphysical a…
Reductionism, Supervenience, and Carnap’s Account of Empirical Confirmability
Rudolf Carnap was one of the earliest proponents of logical positivism/empiricism to explicitly discuss reductionism in relation to mental phenomena from a philosophy of science perspective. In order to address early criticism, Carnap’s account underwent several modifications. An important feature of the ‘mental-to-physical’ reduction endorsed by the later Carnap is that of empirical confirmability. According to this feature, a reduction can only…
Philosophy (10 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Free will (5 works) · Free Will and Agency (5 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Compatibilism (4 works) · Incompatibilism (4 works) · Aesthetics (3 works) · Determinism (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works)