Supervenient fixity and agential possibilities
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20141817 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Maria Sekatskaya (0000-0002-5381-2913, Institute of Philosophy Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf Düsseldorf Germany, corresponding author), Alexander Gebharter (0000-0003-1708-2949, Center for Philosophy, Science, and Policy (CPSP) Marche Polytechnic University Ancona Italy, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 90 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 400-416 |
| Publication date | 2024-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12551 |
| OpenAlex | W4401562545 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 27 |
One of the central problems within the free will debate lies in the apparent incompatibility of an agent's ability to do otherwise and determinism. Recently, compatibilist libertarianism was proposed as an actualist position intended to finally reconcile both. In this article, we argue that in order to maintain consistency, this position must be understood as a variant of classical compatibilism rather than a version of libertarianism. Though this seems to be an undesired consequence for proponents of compatibilist libertarianism, we think that it is not that bad. We show that recent objections to this position can be avoided by embracing its compatibilist nature and argue that a modified version of compatibilist libertarianism might very well be as close to an actualist account of free will in a deterministic world as one can hope for
Aesthetics · Art · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Causes, Laws, and Free Will
Free Will and Luck
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Freedom within Reason
Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective
Are we free to break the laws
The consequence argument ungrounded
Freewill and Responsibility
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |