Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility

Bibliographic Data

ID23359494
AuthorsHarry G Frankfurt (corresponding author)
Year1969
Volume66
Issue23
Pages829
Publication date1969-12-04
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-362X • E-ISSN: 1939-8549
PublisherPhilosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.2307/2023833
OpenAlexW185512519
LanguageEN
Citations received432

A dominant role in nearly all recent inquiries into the free-will problem has been played by a principle which the author shall call ‘the principle of alternate possibilities.’ This principle states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Its exact meaning is a subject of controversy, particularly concerning whether someone who accepts it is thereby committed to believing that moral responsibility and determinism are incompatible. In seeking illustrations of the principle of alternate possibilities, it is most natural to think of situations in which the same circumstances both bring it about that a person does something and make it impossible for him to avoid doing it. The two main concepts employed in the principle of alternate possibilities are ‘morally responsible’ and ‘could have done otherwise.’ To discuss the principle without analyzing either of these concepts may well seem like an attempt at piracy.

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Moral responsibility · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · War, Ethics, and Justification

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