Who's Still Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23601068 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher Taylor (0000-0003-4373-0989, University of Wisconsin–Madison), Daniel C Dennett (0000-0003-1181-3093, Tufts University), Daniel Dennett (Tufts University) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Pages | 221-240 |
| Publication date | 2012-09-18 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | The Oxford handbook of free will (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.003.0011 |
| OpenAlex | W2108502890 |
| ISBN | 9780195399691 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 164 |
This article argues, in defense of compatibilism, that objections to compatibilist accounts of free agency are based on a flawed understanding of the relationship of such notions as possibility and causation to freedom and agency. It undertakes an analysis of the relevant notions of possibility and causation to show this. The article develops a compatibilist view, with special attention to technical issues about the nature of causation and possibility. In the process, it discusses recent technical views about the nature of causality, particularly that of Judea Pearl. It also develops some interesting analogies concerning the functioning of computers to argue that the flexibility, reflexivity, and creativity that free will requires are consistent with the hypothesis that human behavior, like that of intelligent machines, is determined.
Agency (philosophy) · Causality (physics) · Causation · Compatibilism · Determinism · Epistemology · Flexibility (engineering) · Free will · Incompatibilism · Physics · Reflexivity · Social science · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
The anthropic cosmological principle
The intentionality of human action
Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow
Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing
Toward a Dynamic Theory of Intentions
Natural Laws In Scientific Practice
Quantum Mechanics and Experience
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man
The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul
Probabilistic Causality
What Happens When Someone Acts?
Surveying Freedom
Failure to Detect Mismatches Between Intention and Outcome in a Simple Decision Task
Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language
On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals
Unified dynamics for microscopic and macroscopic systems
On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible
Events as Property Exemplifications
The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
The impossibility of moral responsibility
For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything
Masked Abilities and Compatibilism
A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of "Hidden" Variables. I
Social Cognitive Neuroscience
The Physiology of Willpower
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
Human volition
Causal–explanatory pluralism
On the relation between brain potentials and the awareness of voluntary movements
Telling more than we can know
An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment
Freedom and Determinism
Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style Cases
Reasons
Procedural Autonomy and Liberal Legitimacy
Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility
Of Windmills and Straw Men
Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle
Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy
Responsibility and the Condition of Moral Sense
Fatalism and the necessity of the present
Modalities in Medieval Philosophy
Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives
Suarez, Hobbes and the scholastic tradition in action theory
Formal Philosophy
Also sprach Zarathustra I–IV
Causing and Being Responsible for What Is Inevitable
Making Sense of Your Freedom
Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions
Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate About Freedom and Alternative Possibilities
Agency, Responsibility, and Indeterminism
Alternative Possibilities
Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism
Freedom within Reason
Moral Obligation and Accountability
Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities
Complicity
Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios
Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument
Brain preparation before a voluntary action
Cortical Movement Preparation before and after a Conscious Decision to Move
God, fatalism, and temporal ontology
Middle Knowledge and Classical Christian Thought
A formal approach to the problem of free will and determinism
Folk Intuitions on Free Will
Philosophy and the Folk
Folk Fears about Freedom and Responsibility
A Simpler Solution to the Paradoxes of Deontic Logic
An Anti-Molinist Argument
A generalized probabilistic theory of causal relevance
Downward causation in fluid convection
One mind or many ? A note on the everett interpretation of quantum theory
Causality and Determinism
A Rigorous Proof of Determinism Derived from the Special Theory of Relativity
Completeness and Indeterministic Causation
On a Proof of Incompatibilism
Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action
Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument
The Justification of General Deterrence
Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
On Efficient Causality
A Problem for Guidance Control
Belief, Truth and Knowledge
The Idea of Freedom
The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism
A Coherence Theory of Autonomy
Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will
The Mad Scientist Meets the Robot Cats
Indeterminist Free Will
On Divine Foreknowledge and Bringing About the Past
Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions
Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson
The Irrelevance of Indeterministic Counterexamples to Principle Beta
Indeterminism and Free Agency
Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity
Lewis on Finkish Dispositions
Contrastive Explanation and the Demons of Determinism
Emergence or Reduction
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |