Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10345585 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J Robert G Williams (0000-0003-4831-2954, University of Leeds, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 77 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 385-420 |
| Publication date | 2008-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00196.x |
| OpenAlex | W2096538644 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 47 |
| References cited | 11 |
John Hawthorne in a recent paper takes issue with Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, when relevant laws of nature are chancy. I respond to his arguments on behalf of the Lewisian, and conclude that while some can be rebutted, the case against the original Lewisian account is strong. I develop a neo‐Lewisian account of what makes for closeness of worlds. I argue that my revised version avoids Hawthorne's challenges. I argue that this is closer to the spirit of Lewis's first (non‐chancy) proposal than is Lewis's own suggested modification
Closeness · Counterfactual conditional · Counterfactual thinking · Epistemology · Possible world · Similarity (geometry · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
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Introduction
Rollbacks, Endorsements, and Indeterminism
The Consequence Argument Revisited
Contemporary Compatibilism
Obligation, Reason, and Frankfurt Examples
Free-Will Skepticism and Meaning in Life
The Causal Closure of Physics and Free Will
Freedom and action without causation
A Promising Argument
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Free Will and the Bounds of the Self
Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism
Mental Causation
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Heim Sequences and Why Most Unqualified ‘Would’-Counterfactuals Are Not True
Humean Idealism
Counterfactuals, indeterminacy, and value
Are non-accidental regularities a cosmic coincidence? Revisiting a central threat to Humean laws
Levelling counterfactual scepticism
Quasi-miracles, typicality, and counterfactuals
Minkish dispositions
The non-maximality-solution to counterfactual scepticism
Why Dreaming Worlds aren’t Nearby Possible Worlds
The Metaphysical Consequences of Counterfactual Skepticism
Similarity accounts of counterfactuals
Conditional Excluded Middle without the Limit Assumption
Counterfactual Triviality
Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility
A Proposed Probabilistic Extension of the Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual Cause’
| Unique citing works | 47 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,13 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2025 (15) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 47 |