Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality Of Illusion
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23614647 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Saul Smilansky (0000-0001-7503-7607, University of Haifa, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Pages | 425-441 |
| Publication date | 2012-09-18 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | The Oxford handbook of free will (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.003.0021 |
| OpenAlex | W2622836033 |
| ISBN | 9780195399691 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
| References cited | 160 |
This article's view is unusual among contemporary views of free will. It is defined by two radical theses. The first, Fundamental Dualism, says that we can and should be both incompatibilists and compatibilists about freedom and responsibility. There is no reason, the article argues, why it should not be the case that certain forms of moral responsibility, desert, and blame require libertarian free will, whereas other forms can be sustained without it. Thus, if libertarian free will is impossible, there is no reason why we have to choose between hard determinism or compatibilism. The second thesis, Illusionism, is even more radical. It notes that the consequences for humanity of widespread belief that we lack libertarian free will would be dire and destructive. Illusion about free will is therefore morally necessary.
Blame · Compatibilism · Determinism · Dualism · Epistemology · Free will · Illusion · Incompatibilism · Law and economics · Libertarianism · Moral responsibility · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification
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Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility
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Free will in total institutions
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Free to blame? Belief in free will is related to victim blaming
Pereboom and premises
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Implications of the Tasi taxonomy for understanding inconsistent effects pertaining to free will beliefs
The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism
Back to the future
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The anthropic cosmological principle
The intentionality of human action
Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow
Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing
Toward a Dynamic Theory of Intentions
Belief, Truth and Knowledge
Quantum Mechanics and Experience
What Happens When Someone Acts?
Surveying Freedom
Failure to Detect Mismatches Between Intention and Outcome in a Simple Decision Task
Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language
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Unified dynamics for microscopic and macroscopic systems
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The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
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For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything
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Social Cognitive Neuroscience
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Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
Human volition
Causal–explanatory pluralism
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Telling more than we can know
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Freedom and Determinism
Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style Cases
Making Sense of Your Freedom
Reasons
Procedural Autonomy and Liberal Legitimacy
Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility
Of Windmills and Straw Men
Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle
Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy
Responsibility and the Condition of Moral Sense
Fatalism and the necessity of the present
Modalities in Medieval Philosophy
Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives
Suarez, Hobbes and the scholastic tradition in action theory
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Alternative Possibilities
Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism
Freedom within Reason
Moral Obligation and Accountability
Complicity
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Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument
Brain preparation before a voluntary action
Cortical Movement Preparation before and after a Conscious Decision to Move
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Punishment and Responsibility
Folk Intuitions on Free Will
Philosophy and the Folk
Folk Fears about Freedom and Responsibility
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An Anti-Molinist Argument
A generalized probabilistic theory of causal relevance
Downward causation in fluid convection
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The Justification of General Deterrence
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Indeterminist Free Will
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Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions
Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson
The Irrelevance of Indeterministic Counterexamples to Principle Beta
Indeterminism and Free Agency
Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity
Lewis on Finkish Dispositions
Contrastive Explanation and the Demons of Determinism
Emergence or Reduction
Actions, Reasons, and Causes
| Unique citing works | 15 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,68 |
| Citation span | 2004 - 2025 (22) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |