Saul Smilansky
Biographic Data
| ID | 707400 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Saul Smilansky |
| GIVEN NAMES | Saul |
| FAMILY NAME | Smilansky |
| SIGNATURE | SMILANSKY S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Haifa |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7503-7607 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 31 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 16 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 31 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Robert M. Sapolsky, Determined: The Science of Life Without Free Will
Reversing Pascal: Scepticism about religious belief and its value
Pascal famously argued that practical reasoning should lead people to try to form within themselves a commitment to religious practice and obedience, based upon a belief in God. I propose to take a less ambitious argument, which I call the Sensible Argument, and use it to present The Puzzle. I argue that there is a huge puzzle here, about the radical dissonance between the beliefs and practices of many of the purportedly religious. There are, I w…
God as an asset and some paradoxical implications
Conventional monotheist religious believers commonly believe that God will sometimes assist them, will be on their side. God, in other words, they believe, is an asset. Conceptually an asset is anything (such as a person or an object) that can assist one, something that is prima facie good to possess or to have on one's side, that is likely to or can assist one to make one's life go better, overall. Having assets can have weighty implications, in…
The Idea of Moral Duties to History
History is, indeed, little more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind. Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire I argue that there are duties that can be called ‘Moral duties due to history’ or, in short, ‘Duties to History’ (DTH). My claim is not the familiar thought that we need to learn from history on how to live better in the present and going forward, but that history itself creates moral duties…
Black magic and respecting persons—Some perplexities
Black magic (henceforth BM) is acting in an attempt to harm human beings through supernatural means. Examples include the employment of spells, the use of special curses, the burning of objects related to the purported victim, and the use of pins with voodoo dolls. For the sake of simplicity, we shall focus on attempts to kill through BM. The moral attitude towards BM has not been, as far as we know, significantly discussed in contemporary analyt…
Should We Sacrifice the Utilitarians First
It is commonly thought that morality applies universally to all human beings as moral targets, and our general moral obligations to people will not, as a rule, be affected by their views. I propose and explore a radical, alternative normative moral theory, 'Designer Ethics', according to which our views are pro tanto crucial determinants of how, morally, we ought to be treated. For example, since utilitarians are more sympathetic to the idea that…
Punishing the Dead
The Nonidentity Problem
The nonidentity problem (NIP) is one of the great moral discoveries of the twentieth century and a philosophical classic. It is a single, simple, powerful, philosophical conundrum. The different moral perspectives help to show that defending wrongness and blameworthiness despite the NIP does not depend only on a general utilitarianlike position and that such a defense has many diverse philosophical resources to build upon. Melinda Roberts and Dav…
The Paradox of Moral Complaint: A Reply to Shaham
In ‘The Paradox of Moral Complaint’ I took up the question whether a person who has wronged others in certain ways may morally complain if other people then harm him illegitimately in similar ways. I argued that there are strong grounds for saying both Yes and No here, and therefore that our considered moral views seem to be paradoxical. In her reply, Talia Shaham disagrees with the No part of my position. She presents two appealing philosophical…
Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality Of Illusion
This article's view is unusual among contemporary views of free will. It is defined by two radical theses. The first, Fundamental Dualism, says that we can and should be both incompatibilists and compatibilists about freedom and responsibility. There is no reason, the article argues, why it should not be the case that certain forms of moral responsibility, desert, and blame require libertarian free will, whereas other forms can be sustained witho…
The Ethics of Alien Attitudes
1. IntroductionPeople do not always really believe what they take themselves to believe. A person may sincerely say that a certain racist belief is definitively false, but still hold such a belief. When asked what he believes about something, it is likely that he simply expresses his opinion about the issue in question, and this reveals what he takes himself to believe, but not necessarily what he really believes. In some cases, however, a person…
Life is Good
David Benatar has made a number of distinct claims leading to conclusion that giving birth to people harms them, that it is overall impermissible to do so from a moral point of view, and that hence, giving birth needs to be strongly discouraged (Benatar 2006). In response to his work, his exciting direct antinatalist arguments, primarily those concerning asymmetries (such as his claim that being born is always a but not being born is never a harm…
Moral Demands, Moral Pragmatics, and Being Good
I point out an odd consequence of the role that broadly pragmatic considerations regularly (and reasonably) play in determining moral demands. As a result of the way in which moral demands are formed, it turns out that people will frequently become morally good in a strange and rather dubious way. Because human beings are not very good, we will lower our moral demands and, as a result, most people will turn out, in an important sense, to be moral…
If Knowledge Is Good, We Are Always Born Too Early
Moral Paradoxes
Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence – David Benatar
Many philosophers tend to think that a good philosophy book should give a balanced account of the relevant issues, and elucidate and explicate people's intuitions on the topic with which it deals. But many significant philosophical contributions have not been anything like that: on the contrary, they have gone to extremes in a single direction, showing us how far a philosophical imagination can advance into the unknown, and unveiling the unexpect…
Control, Desert and the Difference between Distributive and Retributive Justice
The Paradox of Moral Complaint
When may someone complain, morally? And what, if any, is the relationship between legitimate moral complaint and one's own behaviour? I point out a perplexity about a certain class of moral complaints. Two very different conceptions of moral complaint seem to be operating, and they often have contrary implications. Moreover, both seem intuitively compelling. This is theoretically and practically troubling, but has not been sufficiently noticed. T…
Choice-egalitarianism and the paradox of the baseline
Choice-egalitarianism and the paradox of the baseline Saul Smilansky Saul Smilansky University of HaifaHaifa 31905, [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 63, Issue 2, April 2003, Pages 146–151, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/63.2.146 Published: 01 April 2003
Free will, egalitarianism and rawls
Choice-egalitarianism and the paradox of the baseline
Journal Article Choice-egalitarianism and the paradox of the baseline Get access Saul Smilansky Saul Smilansky University of HaifaHaifa 31905, [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 63, Issue 2, April 2003, Pages 146–151, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/63.2.146 Published: 01 April 2003
Can Deontologists Be Moderate
There is a widespread view according to which deontology can be construed as a flexible, reasonable view, able to incorporate consequentialist considerations when it seems compelling to do so. According to this view, deontologists can be moderate, and their presentation as die-hard fanatics, even if true to some historical figures, is basically a slanderous and misleading philosophical straw man. I argue that deontologists, properly understood, a…
Gratitude, contribution and ethical theory
I attempt to sketch in general terms an alternative moral perspective that goes beyond the traditional normative theories, a moral perspective called ‘contributivism’. This focuses on contribution: caring about one's contribution, I claim, lies at the centre of moral cncern. First I illustrate the need for a contribution-focussed moral theory, primarily by considering gratitude, the typical required response to altruism. Second, I point out some …
IV- Free Will: From Nature To Illusion
Egalitarian justice and the importance of the free will problem
The Ethical Advantages of Hard Determinism
I sometimes act morally, doing what I think I morally ought to do. If hard determinism is the correct position with respect to the free will problem, I am not morally responsible for such acts, I am not praiseworthy for acting morally nor would I be blameworthy were I not to have so acted.' For according to hard determinism libertarian free will2 is required in order for moral responsibility to be possible, but people do not have libertarian free…
The Paradox of Moral Complaint
When may someone complain, morally? And what, if any, is the relationship between legitimate moral complaint and one's own behaviour? I point out a perplexity about a certain class of moral complaints. Two very different conceptions of moral complaint seem to be operating, and they often have contrary implications. Moreover, both seem intuitively compelling. This is theoretically and practically troubling, but has not been sufficiently noticed. T…
Should I Be Grateful to You for Not Harming Me
Getting people not to harm others is a central goal of morality. But while it is commonly perceived that those who benefit others merit gratitude, those who do not harm others are not ordinarily thought to merit anything. I attempt to argue against this, claiming that all the arguments against gratitude to the non-maleficent are unsuccessful. Finally, I explore the difference it would make if we thought that we owe gratitude to those who do not h…
The Paradox of Moral Complaint: A Reply to Shaham
In ‘The Paradox of Moral Complaint’ I took up the question whether a person who has wronged others in certain ways may morally complain if other people then harm him illegitimately in similar ways. I argued that there are strong grounds for saying both Yes and No here, and therefore that our considered moral views seem to be paradoxical. In her reply, Talia Shaham disagrees with the No part of my position. She presents two appealing philosophical…
Can Deontologists Be Moderate
There is a widespread view according to which deontology can be construed as a flexible, reasonable view, able to incorporate consequentialist considerations when it seems compelling to do so. According to this view, deontologists can be moderate, and their presentation as die-hard fanatics, even if true to some historical figures, is basically a slanderous and misleading philosophical straw man. I argue that deontologists, properly understood, a…
Life is Good
David Benatar has made a number of distinct claims leading to conclusion that giving birth to people harms them, that it is overall impermissible to do so from a moral point of view, and that hence, giving birth needs to be strongly discouraged (Benatar 2006). In response to his work, his exciting direct antinatalist arguments, primarily those concerning asymmetries (such as his claim that being born is always a but not being born is never a harm…
Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence – David Benatar
Many philosophers tend to think that a good philosophy book should give a balanced account of the relevant issues, and elucidate and explicate people's intuitions on the topic with which it deals. But many significant philosophical contributions have not been anything like that: on the contrary, they have gone to extremes in a single direction, showing us how far a philosophical imagination can advance into the unknown, and unveiling the unexpect…
Van Inwagen on the 'Obviousness' of Libertarian Moral Responsibility
The time to punish
The time to punish Get access Saul Smilansky Saul Smilansky University of HaifaHaifa 31999, Israelrhph744@haifauvm Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 54, Issue 1, January 1994, Pages 50–53, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/54.1.50 Published: 01 January 1994
Fortunate Misfortune
Sometimes people are unfortunate in ways which facilitate their success ‐ and happiness. This creates the perplexity whether someone can be said to have been unfortunate, if an apparent misfortune has been, overall, beneficial to his or her life. I argue that whether something is a misfortune cannot be determined in itself, even in seemingly obvious cases. It depends also upon what one makes of it, what it makes of one. In short, it depends upon …
The Ethical Advantages of Hard Determinism
I sometimes act morally, doing what I think I morally ought to do. If hard determinism is the correct position with respect to the free will problem, I am not morally responsible for such acts, I am not praiseworthy for acting morally nor would I be blameworthy were I not to have so acted.' For according to hard determinism libertarian free will2 is required in order for moral responsibility to be possible, but people do not have libertarian free…
Responsibility and Desert: Defending The Connection
Feldman (1995) makes a striking claim: our central philosophical way of thinking about desert is misguided. Feldman targets two elements of the philosophical understanding of the notion of desert: the connection between and desert, and the connection between time and desert. I believe that we have the resources to handle Feldman's doubts about and desert, and maintain the conceptual connection between the two. Like Feldman, I concentrate on the c…
Egalitarian justice and the importance of the free will problem
Should I Be Grateful to You for Not Harming Me
Getting people not to harm others is a central goal of morality. But while it is commonly perceived that those who benefit others merit gratitude, those who do not harm others are not ordinarily thought to merit anything. I attempt to argue against this, claiming that all the arguments against gratitude to the non-maleficent are unsuccessful. Finally, I explore the difference it would make if we thought that we owe gratitude to those who do not h…
IV- Free Will: From Nature To Illusion
Gratitude, contribution and ethical theory
I attempt to sketch in general terms an alternative moral perspective that goes beyond the traditional normative theories, a moral perspective called ‘contributivism’. This focuses on contribution: caring about one's contribution, I claim, lies at the centre of moral cncern. First I illustrate the need for a contribution-focussed moral theory, primarily by considering gratitude, the typical required response to altruism. Second, I point out some …
Choice-egalitarianism and the paradox of the baseline
Choice-egalitarianism and the paradox of the baseline Saul Smilansky Saul Smilansky University of HaifaHaifa 31905, [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 63, Issue 2, April 2003, Pages 146–151, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/63.2.146 Published: 01 April 2003
Free will, egalitarianism and rawls
Choice-egalitarianism and the paradox of the baseline
Journal Article Choice-egalitarianism and the paradox of the baseline Get access Saul Smilansky Saul Smilansky University of HaifaHaifa 31905, [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 63, Issue 2, April 2003, Pages 146–151, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/63.2.146 Published: 01 April 2003
Can Deontologists Be Moderate
There is a widespread view according to which deontology can be construed as a flexible, reasonable view, able to incorporate consequentialist considerations when it seems compelling to do so. According to this view, deontologists can be moderate, and their presentation as die-hard fanatics, even if true to some historical figures, is basically a slanderous and misleading philosophical straw man. I argue that deontologists, properly understood, a…
Control, Desert and the Difference between Distributive and Retributive Justice
The Paradox of Moral Complaint
When may someone complain, morally? And what, if any, is the relationship between legitimate moral complaint and one's own behaviour? I point out a perplexity about a certain class of moral complaints. Two very different conceptions of moral complaint seem to be operating, and they often have contrary implications. Moreover, both seem intuitively compelling. This is theoretically and practically troubling, but has not been sufficiently noticed. T…
Moral Paradoxes
Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence – David Benatar
Many philosophers tend to think that a good philosophy book should give a balanced account of the relevant issues, and elucidate and explicate people's intuitions on the topic with which it deals. But many significant philosophical contributions have not been anything like that: on the contrary, they have gone to extremes in a single direction, showing us how far a philosophical imagination can advance into the unknown, and unveiling the unexpect…
If Knowledge Is Good, We Are Always Born Too Early
Moral Demands, Moral Pragmatics, and Being Good
I point out an odd consequence of the role that broadly pragmatic considerations regularly (and reasonably) play in determining moral demands. As a result of the way in which moral demands are formed, it turns out that people will frequently become morally good in a strange and rather dubious way. Because human beings are not very good, we will lower our moral demands and, as a result, most people will turn out, in an important sense, to be moral…
Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality Of Illusion
This article's view is unusual among contemporary views of free will. It is defined by two radical theses. The first, Fundamental Dualism, says that we can and should be both incompatibilists and compatibilists about freedom and responsibility. There is no reason, the article argues, why it should not be the case that certain forms of moral responsibility, desert, and blame require libertarian free will, whereas other forms can be sustained witho…
The Ethics of Alien Attitudes
1. IntroductionPeople do not always really believe what they take themselves to believe. A person may sincerely say that a certain racist belief is definitively false, but still hold such a belief. When asked what he believes about something, it is likely that he simply expresses his opinion about the issue in question, and this reveals what he takes himself to believe, but not necessarily what he really believes. In some cases, however, a person…
Life is Good
David Benatar has made a number of distinct claims leading to conclusion that giving birth to people harms them, that it is overall impermissible to do so from a moral point of view, and that hence, giving birth needs to be strongly discouraged (Benatar 2006). In response to his work, his exciting direct antinatalist arguments, primarily those concerning asymmetries (such as his claim that being born is always a but not being born is never a harm…
The Paradox of Moral Complaint: A Reply to Shaham
In ‘The Paradox of Moral Complaint’ I took up the question whether a person who has wronged others in certain ways may morally complain if other people then harm him illegitimately in similar ways. I argued that there are strong grounds for saying both Yes and No here, and therefore that our considered moral views seem to be paradoxical. In her reply, Talia Shaham disagrees with the No part of my position. She presents two appealing philosophical…
The Nonidentity Problem
The nonidentity problem (NIP) is one of the great moral discoveries of the twentieth century and a philosophical classic. It is a single, simple, powerful, philosophical conundrum. The different moral perspectives help to show that defending wrongness and blameworthiness despite the NIP does not depend only on a general utilitarianlike position and that such a defense has many diverse philosophical resources to build upon. Melinda Roberts and Dav…
Punishing the Dead
Philosophy (25 works) · Epistemology (21 works) · Sociology (19 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (14 works) · Psychology (14 works) · Social Psychology (11 works) · Free Will and Agency (10 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (10 works) · Political science (10 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (9 works)