Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23358339 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joshua Knobe (0000-0003-0733-3775, Princeton University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 190-194 |
| Publication date | 2003-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Analysis (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-2638 • E-ISSN: 1467-8284 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/analys/63.3.190 |
| OpenAlex | W2118314955 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 193 |
| References cited | 3 |
There has been a long-standing dispute in the philosophical literature about the conditions under which a behavior counts as 'intentional.' Much of the debate turns on questions about the use of certain words and phrases in ordinary language. The present paper investigates these questions empirically, using experimental techniques to investigate people's use of the relevant words and phrases. g
Action (physics) · Epistemology · Linguistics · Ordinary language philosophy · Physics · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
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| Citation span | 2006 - 2026 (21) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 186 |