Deciding

How special is it

Bibliographic Data

ID21702913
AuthorsAlfred R Mele (0000-0002-4988-1027, Florida State University, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume24
Issue3
Pages359-375
Publication date2021-09-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Explorations (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1386-9795 • E-ISSN: 1741-5918
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13869795.2021.1957203
OpenAlexW3183657766
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited21

To decide to A, as I conceive of it, is to perform a momentary mental action of forming an intention to A. I argue that ordinary instances of practical deciding, so conceived, falsify the following two theses: (1) Necessarily, S intentionally A-s only if S intends to A; (2) In every actual case of intentionally A-ing, the agent intends to A. But I also argue that actions of some other types falsify these theses. Practical deciding is not unique in this respect. In another respect, however, it may be unique. It may be the only source of counterexamples to the thesis that, in any actual case of intentional action, some relevant intention is at work. In addition, actual instances of deciding to A may differ from other actual basic actions in that whereas the latter are successful attempts to A, actual agents never try to decide to A (as opposed to trying to decide what to do and to trying to bring it about that they decide to A)

Counterexample · Epistemology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology

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