Free Will is not a Mystery
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23623594 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Laura W Ekstrom (0000-0002-1665-5146, William & Mary, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Pages | 366-380 |
| Publication date | 2012-09-18 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | The Oxford handbook of free will (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.003.0018 |
| OpenAlex | W2731444077 |
| ISBN | 9780195399691 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 161 |
This article defends an event-causal libertarian view. To introduce the view, the first half of the article deals with another notion that has been entwined with contemporary debates about free will and has also generated a large recent literature, the notion of autonomy or self-determination. The coherence account of autonomy can be interpreted in compatibilist terms. But the article notes that free agency also requires alternative possibilities and these require indeterminism. It argues that indeterminism can be introduced into the picture of autonomous action by supposing that free actions result by “normal causal processes” from preferences that were “noncoercively formed” and were caused but not determined by the agent's considerations.
Action (physics) · Agency (philosophy) · Autonomy · Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) · Compatibilism · Determinism · Epistemology · Event (particle physics) · Free will · Incompatibilism · Indeterminism · Law and economics · Physics · Political science · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Law · Mathematics · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
Toward a plausible event-causal indeterminist account of free will
Why a Virtual Assistant for Moral Enhancement When We Could have a Socrates
The Complex Tapestry of Free Will
Does Free Will Really Exist? The Motivational Congruence Theory’s Perspective
How do we Sign a Contract if Everything is Predetermined
The intentionality of human action
Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow
Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing
Toward a Dynamic Theory of Intentions
Belief, Truth and Knowledge
Quantum Mechanics and Experience
What Happens When Someone Acts?
Surveying Freedom
Failure to Detect Mismatches Between Intention and Outcome in a Simple Decision Task
Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language
On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals
Unified dynamics for microscopic and macroscopic systems
On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible
Events as Property Exemplifications
The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
The impossibility of moral responsibility
For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything
Masked Abilities and Compatibilism
A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of "Hidden" Variables. I
Social Cognitive Neuroscience
The Physiology of Willpower
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
Human volition
Causal–explanatory pluralism
On the relation between brain potentials and the awareness of voluntary movements
Telling more than we can know
An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment
Freedom and Determinism
Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style Cases
Making Sense of Your Freedom
Reasons
Procedural Autonomy and Liberal Legitimacy
Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility
Of Windmills and Straw Men
Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle
Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy
Responsibility and the Condition of Moral Sense
Fatalism and the necessity of the present
Modalities in Medieval Philosophy
Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives
Suarez, Hobbes and the scholastic tradition in action theory
Formal Philosophy
Also sprach Zarathustra I–IV
Causing and Being Responsible for What Is Inevitable
A Companion to the Philosophy of Action
Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions
Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate About Freedom and Alternative Possibilities
Agency, Responsibility, and Indeterminism
Alternative Possibilities
Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism
Freedom within Reason
Moral Obligation and Accountability
Complicity
Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios
Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument
Brain preparation before a voluntary action
Cortical Movement Preparation before and after a Conscious Decision to Move
God, fatalism, and temporal ontology
Middle Knowledge and Classical Christian Thought
A formal approach to the problem of free will and determinism
Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation
Punishment and Responsibility
Folk Intuitions on Free Will
Philosophy and the Folk
Folk Fears about Freedom and Responsibility
A Simpler Solution to the Paradoxes of Deontic Logic
An Anti-Molinist Argument
A generalized probabilistic theory of causal relevance
Downward causation in fluid convection
One mind or many ? A note on the everett interpretation of quantum theory
A Rigorous Proof of Determinism Derived from the Special Theory of Relativity
Completeness and Indeterministic Causation
On a Proof of Incompatibilism
Causality and Determinism
Scientific Essentialism
Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action
Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument
The Justification of General Deterrence
Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
On Efficient Causality
A Problem for Guidance Control
Freewill and Responsibility
The Idea of Freedom
The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism
A Coherence Theory of Autonomy
Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will
The Mad Scientist Meets the Robot Cats
Indeterminist Free Will
On Divine Foreknowledge and Bringing About the Past
Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions
Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson
The Irrelevance of Indeterministic Counterexamples to Principle Beta
Indeterminism and Free Agency
Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity
Lewis on Finkish Dispositions
Contrastive Explanation and the Demons of Determinism
Emergence or Reduction
Philosophical Studies
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,71 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2024 (6) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |