Dennett’s prime‐mammal objection to the consequence argument
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143601 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Johan E Gustafsson (0000-0002-9618-577X, University of Texas at Austin Austin Texas USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 89 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 467-470 |
| Publication date | 2023-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12467 |
| OpenAlex | W4384407826 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
The Consequence Argument is the classic argument for the incompatibility of determinism and our ability to do otherwise. Daniel C. Dennett objects that the Consequence Argument suffers from the same error as a clearly unconvincing argument that there are no mammals. In this paper, I argue that these arguments do not suffer from the same error. The argument that there are no mammals is unconvincing as it takes the form of a sorites, whereas the Consequence Argument does not. Accordingly, Dennett's objection misses its mark
Argument (complex analysis) · Argument map · Biology · Compatibilism · Determinism · Epistemology · Incompatibilism · Teleological argument · Free Will and Agency · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
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Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science.
Are we free to break the laws
A formal approach to the problem of free will and determinism
Infinity and Vagueness
The incompatibility of free will and determinism
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |