Matt Lutz
Biographic Data
| ID | 5997157 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Matt Lutz |
| GIVEN NAMES | Matt |
| FAMILY NAME | Lutz |
| SIGNATURE | LUTZ M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Wuhan University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6263-5883 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
In Defense of Deliberative Indispensability
David Enoch has argued that we can be justified in believing in irreducibly normative reasons on the grounds that such reasons are deliberatively indispensable. This deliberative indispensability argument has been attacked from a variety of angles and is generally held to be rather weak. In this paper, I argue that existing criticisms of the deliberative indispensability argument do not touch the core of Enoch's argument. Properly understood, the…
The Moral Closure Argument
A skeptical hypothesis argument introduces a scenario—a skeptical hypothesis—where our beliefs about some subject matter are systematically false, but our experiences do not discriminate between the case where our beliefs are true and the skeptical scenario where they are not. Because we are unable to rule out this scenario, we do not know that any of our beliefs about the subject matter are true. This is a familiar kind of skeptical argument and…
Background beliefs and plausibility thresholds
The pragmatics of pragmatic encroachment
The pragmatics of pragmatic encroachment
Background beliefs and plausibility thresholds
The Moral Closure Argument
A skeptical hypothesis argument introduces a scenario—a skeptical hypothesis—where our beliefs about some subject matter are systematically false, but our experiences do not discriminate between the case where our beliefs are true and the skeptical scenario where they are not. Because we are unable to rule out this scenario, we do not know that any of our beliefs about the subject matter are true. This is a familiar kind of skeptical argument and…
In Defense of Deliberative Indispensability
David Enoch has argued that we can be justified in believing in irreducibly normative reasons on the grounds that such reasons are deliberatively indispensable. This deliberative indispensability argument has been attacked from a variety of angles and is generally held to be rather weak. In this paper, I argue that existing criticisms of the deliberative indispensability argument do not touch the core of Enoch's argument. Properly understood, the…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Philosophy of science (2 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (2 works) · Disposition (1 works) · Falsity (1 works)