The Moral Closure Argument

Bibliographic Data

ID19524684
AuthorsMatt Lutz (0000-0002-6263-5883, Wuhan University, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume19
Issue1
Pages80-110
Publication date2021-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1559-3061 • E-ISSN: 1559-3061
PublisherJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.26556/jesp.v19i1.243
OpenAlexW3123178691
LanguageEN
References cited39

A skeptical hypothesis argument introduces a scenario—a skeptical hypothesis—where our beliefs about some subject matter are systematically false, but our experiences do not discriminate between the case where our beliefs are true and the skeptical scenario where they are not. Because we are unable to rule out this scenario, we do not know that any of our beliefs about the subject matter are true. This is a familiar kind of skeptical argument and, in this case, familiarity breeds contempt. Epistemologists have developed a variety of strategies for responding to skeptical hypothesis arguments, and so it is widely assumed that any such argument must fail. In this paper, I present a skeptical hypothesis argument—the Moral Closure Argument—and argue that this argument succeeds where other skeptical hypothesis arguments fail. I do so by examining some of the most popular and promising lines of response to skeptical hypothesis arguments, and showing that they all fail to rebut the Moral Closure Argument. This makes the Moral Closure Argument a particularly potent version of a skeptical hypothesis argument. It presents a surprisingly strong case for moral skepticism

Epistemology · Political science · Law · Medicine · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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