Andrés Perea
Biographic Data
| ID | 5997267 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrés Perea |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrés |
| FAMILY NAME | Perea |
| SIGNATURE | PEREA A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Maastricht University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7712-5184 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 13 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Consequentialism in dynamic games
In this paper we study the idea of consequentialism in dynamic games by considering two versions: A commonly used utility-based version stating that the player’s preferences are governed by a utility function on consequences, and a preference-based version which faithfully translates the original idea of consequentialism to restrictions on the player’s preferences. Utility-based consequentialism always implies preference-based consequentialism, b…
Expected utility as an expression of linear preference intensity
Following Gilboa and Schmeidler (Games Econ Behav 44:184–194, 2003) we consider a scenario where the decision maker holds, for every possible probabilistic belief about the states, a preference relation over his choices. For this setting, Gilboa and Schmeidler have offered conditions that allow for an expected utility representation. Their central condition is the diversity axiom which states that for every strict ordering of at most four choices…
Rational updating at the crossroads
In this paper we explore the absentminded driver problem using two different scenarios. In the first scenario we assume that the driver is capable of reasoning about his degree of absentmindedness before he hits the highway. This leads to a Savage-style model where the states are mutually exclusive and the act-state independence is in place. In the second we employ centred possibilities, by modelling the states (i.e. the events about which the dr…
Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness
This paper investigates static games with unawareness, where players may be unaware of some of the choices that can be made. That is, different players may have different views on the game. We propose an epistemic model that encodes players’ belief hierarchies on choices and views, and use it to formulate the basic reasoning concept of common belief in rationality . We do so for two scenarios: one in which we only limit the possible views that ma…
Gabriel Frahm, Rational Choice and Strategic Conflict
By reading the literature, one often gets the impression that decision theory and game theory represent two separate worlds. This not only applies to classical texts such as the game theory books by von Neumann and Morgenstern and Luce and Raiffa, but also to more recent treatments of game theory. Many people will find this puzzling, as game theory may naturally be viewed as an instance of decision theory where every player faces his own, persona…
Common belief in approximate rationality
Commitment in alternating offers bargaining
Agreeing to disagree with lexicographic prior beliefs
Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion
The Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution with loss aversion
Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction
A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies
Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents’ rationality (BOR), stating that a player believes that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player believes that his opponents hold correct beliefs about his own beliefs, (3) projective beliefs (PB), stating that i believes that j’s belief about k’s choice is the s…
Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining
Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining
Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness
This paper investigates static games with unawareness, where players may be unaware of some of the choices that can be made. That is, different players may have different views on the game. We propose an epistemic model that encodes players’ belief hierarchies on choices and views, and use it to formulate the basic reasoning concept of common belief in rationality . We do so for two scenarios: one in which we only limit the possible views that ma…
Commitment in alternating offers bargaining
Agreeing to disagree with lexicographic prior beliefs
A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies
Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents’ rationality (BOR), stating that a player believes that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player believes that his opponents hold correct beliefs about his own beliefs, (3) projective beliefs (PB), stating that i believes that j’s belief about k’s choice is the s…
Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining
A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies
Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents’ rationality (BOR), stating that a player believes that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player believes that his opponents hold correct beliefs about his own beliefs, (3) projective beliefs (PB), stating that i believes that j’s belief about k’s choice is the s…
Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction
The Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution with loss aversion
Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion
Agreeing to disagree with lexicographic prior beliefs
Commitment in alternating offers bargaining
Common belief in approximate rationality
Gabriel Frahm, Rational Choice and Strategic Conflict
By reading the literature, one often gets the impression that decision theory and game theory represent two separate worlds. This not only applies to classical texts such as the game theory books by von Neumann and Morgenstern and Luce and Raiffa, but also to more recent treatments of game theory. Many people will find this puzzling, as game theory may naturally be viewed as an instance of decision theory where every player faces his own, persona…
Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness
This paper investigates static games with unawareness, where players may be unaware of some of the choices that can be made. That is, different players may have different views on the game. We propose an epistemic model that encodes players’ belief hierarchies on choices and views, and use it to formulate the basic reasoning concept of common belief in rationality . We do so for two scenarios: one in which we only limit the possible views that ma…
Rational updating at the crossroads
In this paper we explore the absentminded driver problem using two different scenarios. In the first scenario we assume that the driver is capable of reasoning about his degree of absentmindedness before he hits the highway. This leads to a Savage-style model where the states are mutually exclusive and the act-state independence is in place. In the second we employ centred possibilities, by modelling the states (i.e. the events about which the dr…
Expected utility as an expression of linear preference intensity
Following Gilboa and Schmeidler (Games Econ Behav 44:184–194, 2003) we consider a scenario where the decision maker holds, for every possible probabilistic belief about the states, a preference relation over his choices. For this setting, Gilboa and Schmeidler have offered conditions that allow for an expected utility representation. Their central condition is the diversity axiom which states that for every strict ordering of at most four choices…
Consequentialism in dynamic games
In this paper we study the idea of consequentialism in dynamic games by considering two versions: A commonly used utility-based version stating that the player’s preferences are governed by a utility function on consequences, and a preference-based version which faithfully translates the original idea of consequentialism to restrictions on the player’s preferences. Utility-based consequentialism always implies preference-based consequentialism, b…
Mathematical economics (11 works) · Mathematics (11 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Game Theory and Applications (8 works) · Economics (7 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (7 works) · Economic theories and models (6 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Rationality (5 works)