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Rainald Borck

Biographic Data

ID6009914
NAMERainald Borck
GIVEN NAMESRainald
FAMILY NAMEBorck
SIGNATUREBORCK R
AFFILIATIONSGerman Institute for Economic Research
ORCID0000-0003-0833-020X
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS18
TOTAL CITATIONS43
AUTHOR COUNT18
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1996
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX5
  • Property tax competition: A quantitative assessment

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Jun Oshiro et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2026

    We develop a model of property taxation and characterize equilibria under three alternative taxation regimes often used in the public finance literature: decentralized taxation, centralized taxation, and “rent seeking” regimes. We show that decentralized taxation results in inefficiently high tax rates, whereas centralized taxation yields a common optimal tax rate, and tax rates in the rent-seeking regime can be either inefficiently high or low. …

  • Energy policies and pollution in two developing country cities: A quantitative model

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Peter Mulder•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2024•References: 2

  • Population density and urban air quality

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Philipp Schrauth•ARTICLE•Regional Science and Urban…•2021

  • Political Participation and the Welfare State

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2018

  • Pollution and city size: Can cities be too small

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Takatoshi Tabuchi•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Geography•2018•Cited by: 1

    We study optimal and equilibrium sizes of cities in a city system model with pollution. Pollution is a function of population size. If pollution is local or per-capita pollution increases with population, equilibrium cities are too large under symmetry; with asymmetric cities, the largest cities are too large and the smallest too small. When pollution is global and per-capita pollution declines with city size, cities may be too small under symmet…

  • The Political Economics of Higher-Education Finance for Mobile Individuals

    Rainald Borck, Silke Uebelmesser et al.•ARTICLE•FinanzArchiv•2015

    We study voting over higher-education finance in an economy with two regions and two separated labor markets. Households differ in their financial endowment and their children's ability. Nonstudents are immobile. Students decide where to study; they return home after graduation with exogenous probability. The voters of the two regions decide on whether to subsidize higher-education costs or to rely on tuition fees only. We find that in equilibriu…

  • Adieu Rabenmutter—culture, fertility, female labour supply, the gender wage gap and childcare

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Journal of Population Economics•2014•Cited by: 10•References: 6

  • A simple theory of industry location and residence choice

    Rainald Borck, MICHAEL PFLÜGER et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Geography•2009•Cited by: 1•References: 1

    Journal Article A simple theory of industry location and residence choice Get access Rainald Borck, Rainald Borck **Department of Economics, University of Passau, Innstr. 27, 94032 Passau, CESifo and DIW Berlin, Germany. email Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Michael Pflüger, Michael Pflüger ****Department of Economics, University of Passau, Innstr. 27, 94032 Passau, DIW Berlin and IZA, Germany. email Searc…

  • Subsidies for intracity and intercity commuting

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Matthias Wrede•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2009•Cited by: 3•References: 19

  • Commuting subsidies with two transport modes

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Matthias Wrede•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2008•Cited by: 5•References: 9

  • Fiscal Competition and the Composition of Public Spending: Theory and Evidence

    Rainald Borck, Marco Caliendo et al.•ARTICLE•FinanzArchiv•2007

    We consider fiscal competition between jurisdictions. Capital taxes are used to finance a public input and two public goods: one that benefits mobile skilled workers and one that benefits immobile unskilled workers. We derive the jurisdictions' reaction functions for different spending categories. We then estimate these reaction functions using data from German communities. Thereby we explicitly allow for a spatially lagged dependent variable and…

  • Consumption and Social Life in Cities: Evidence from Germany

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Urban Studies•2007•Cited by: 5•References: 22

    This paper examines social agglomeration externalities. Using survey data from the German Socioeconomic Panel, it examines the link between city size and different measures of consumption, social interaction and social capital. There is strong evidence of agglomeration effects in consumption, while positive effects of city size on social interaction and social capital variables seem to some extent to be driven by sorting. Further, using responses…

  • Fiscal Competition, Capital-Skill Complementarity, and the Composition of Public Spending

    Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•FinanzArchiv•2005

    Following Keen and Marchand (1997), the paper analyzes the effect of fiscal competition on the composition of public spending in a model where capital and skilled workers are mobile while low-skilled workers are immobile. Taxes are levied on capital and labor. Each group of workers benefits from a different kind of public good. Mobility of skilled workers provides an incentive for jurisdictions to spend too much on public goods benefiting the ski…

  • Political economy of commuting subsidies

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Matthias Wrede•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2005•Cited by: 8•References: 14

  • Tax competition and the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2003•Cited by: 3•References: 9

  • Jurisdiction Size, Political Participation, and the Allocation of Resources

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2002•Cited by: 5•References: 24

  • Pareto Efficiency and Majority Voting: Why High Taxes on the Middle Class may be Desirable

    Open Access•Pio Baake, Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2000•References: 6

  • Ideology and interest groups

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1996•Cited by: 2•References: 16

  • Adieu Rabenmutter—culture, fertility, female labour supply, the gender wage gap and childcare

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Journal of Population Economics•2014•Cited by: 10•References: 6

  • Political economy of commuting subsidies

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Matthias Wrede•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2005•Cited by: 8•References: 14

  • Commuting subsidies with two transport modes

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Matthias Wrede•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2008•Cited by: 5•References: 9

  • Consumption and Social Life in Cities: Evidence from Germany

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Urban Studies•2007•Cited by: 5•References: 22

    This paper examines social agglomeration externalities. Using survey data from the German Socioeconomic Panel, it examines the link between city size and different measures of consumption, social interaction and social capital. There is strong evidence of agglomeration effects in consumption, while positive effects of city size on social interaction and social capital variables seem to some extent to be driven by sorting. Further, using responses…

  • Jurisdiction Size, Political Participation, and the Allocation of Resources

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2002•Cited by: 5•References: 24

  • Subsidies for intracity and intercity commuting

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Matthias Wrede•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2009•Cited by: 3•References: 19

  • Tax competition and the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2003•Cited by: 3•References: 9

  • Ideology and interest groups

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1996•Cited by: 2•References: 16

  • Pollution and city size: Can cities be too small

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Takatoshi Tabuchi•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Geography•2018•Cited by: 1

    We study optimal and equilibrium sizes of cities in a city system model with pollution. Pollution is a function of population size. If pollution is local or per-capita pollution increases with population, equilibrium cities are too large under symmetry; with asymmetric cities, the largest cities are too large and the smallest too small. When pollution is global and per-capita pollution declines with city size, cities may be too small under symmet…

  • A simple theory of industry location and residence choice

    Rainald Borck, MICHAEL PFLÜGER et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Geography•2009•Cited by: 1•References: 1

    Journal Article A simple theory of industry location and residence choice Get access Rainald Borck, Rainald Borck **Department of Economics, University of Passau, Innstr. 27, 94032 Passau, CESifo and DIW Berlin, Germany. email Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Michael Pflüger, Michael Pflüger ****Department of Economics, University of Passau, Innstr. 27, 94032 Passau, DIW Berlin and IZA, Germany. email Searc…

  • Ideology and interest groups

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1996•Cited by: 2•References: 16

  • Pareto Efficiency and Majority Voting: Why High Taxes on the Middle Class may be Desirable

    Open Access•Pio Baake, Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2000•References: 6

  • Jurisdiction Size, Political Participation, and the Allocation of Resources

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2002•Cited by: 5•References: 24

  • Tax competition and the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2003•Cited by: 3•References: 9

  • Fiscal Competition, Capital-Skill Complementarity, and the Composition of Public Spending

    Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•FinanzArchiv•2005

    Following Keen and Marchand (1997), the paper analyzes the effect of fiscal competition on the composition of public spending in a model where capital and skilled workers are mobile while low-skilled workers are immobile. Taxes are levied on capital and labor. Each group of workers benefits from a different kind of public good. Mobility of skilled workers provides an incentive for jurisdictions to spend too much on public goods benefiting the ski…

  • Political economy of commuting subsidies

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Matthias Wrede•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2005•Cited by: 8•References: 14

  • Fiscal Competition and the Composition of Public Spending: Theory and Evidence

    Rainald Borck, Marco Caliendo et al.•ARTICLE•FinanzArchiv•2007

    We consider fiscal competition between jurisdictions. Capital taxes are used to finance a public input and two public goods: one that benefits mobile skilled workers and one that benefits immobile unskilled workers. We derive the jurisdictions' reaction functions for different spending categories. We then estimate these reaction functions using data from German communities. Thereby we explicitly allow for a spatially lagged dependent variable and…

  • Consumption and Social Life in Cities: Evidence from Germany

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Urban Studies•2007•Cited by: 5•References: 22

    This paper examines social agglomeration externalities. Using survey data from the German Socioeconomic Panel, it examines the link between city size and different measures of consumption, social interaction and social capital. There is strong evidence of agglomeration effects in consumption, while positive effects of city size on social interaction and social capital variables seem to some extent to be driven by sorting. Further, using responses…

  • Commuting subsidies with two transport modes

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Matthias Wrede•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2008•Cited by: 5•References: 9

  • A simple theory of industry location and residence choice

    Rainald Borck, MICHAEL PFLÜGER et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Geography•2009•Cited by: 1•References: 1

    Journal Article A simple theory of industry location and residence choice Get access Rainald Borck, Rainald Borck **Department of Economics, University of Passau, Innstr. 27, 94032 Passau, CESifo and DIW Berlin, Germany. email Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Michael Pflüger, Michael Pflüger ****Department of Economics, University of Passau, Innstr. 27, 94032 Passau, DIW Berlin and IZA, Germany. email Searc…

  • Subsidies for intracity and intercity commuting

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Matthias Wrede•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2009•Cited by: 3•References: 19

  • Adieu Rabenmutter—culture, fertility, female labour supply, the gender wage gap and childcare

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•Journal of Population Economics•2014•Cited by: 10•References: 6

  • The Political Economics of Higher-Education Finance for Mobile Individuals

    Rainald Borck, Silke Uebelmesser et al.•ARTICLE•FinanzArchiv•2015

    We study voting over higher-education finance in an economy with two regions and two separated labor markets. Households differ in their financial endowment and their children's ability. Nonstudents are immobile. Students decide where to study; they return home after graduation with exogenous probability. The voters of the two regions decide on whether to subsidize higher-education costs or to rely on tuition fees only. We find that in equilibriu…

  • Political Participation and the Welfare State

    Open Access•Rainald Borck•ARTICLE•SSRN Electronic Journal•2018

  • Pollution and city size: Can cities be too small

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Takatoshi Tabuchi•ARTICLE•Journal of Economic Geography•2018•Cited by: 1

    We study optimal and equilibrium sizes of cities in a city system model with pollution. Pollution is a function of population size. If pollution is local or per-capita pollution increases with population, equilibrium cities are too large under symmetry; with asymmetric cities, the largest cities are too large and the smallest too small. When pollution is global and per-capita pollution declines with city size, cities may be too small under symmet…

  • Population density and urban air quality

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Philipp Schrauth•ARTICLE•Regional Science and Urban…•2021

  • Energy policies and pollution in two developing country cities: A quantitative model

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Peter Mulder•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2024•References: 2

  • Property tax competition: A quantitative assessment

    Open Access•Rainald Borck, Jun Oshiro et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Urban Economics•2026

    We develop a model of property taxation and characterize equilibria under three alternative taxation regimes often used in the public finance literature: decentralized taxation, centralized taxation, and “rent seeking” regimes. We show that decentralized taxation results in inefficiently high tax rates, whereas centralized taxation yields a common optimal tax rate, and tax rates in the rent-seeking regime can be either inefficiently high or low. …

Economics (15 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (12 works) · Public economics (9 works) · Microeconomics (7 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Politics (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Demography (4 works)

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