Deborah Perron Tollefsen
Biographic Data
| ID | 6037243 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Deborah Perron Tollefsen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Deborah Perron |
| FAMILY NAME | Tollefsen |
| SIGNATURE | TOLLEFSEN D P |
| AFFILIATIONS | The Ohio State University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 17 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Collective Intentionality and Methodology in the Social Sciences
This chapter discusses the extent to which philosophers within the field of collective intentionality have adopted an individualistic approach to explaining social phenomena. Methodological individualism, as it developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, was a thesis about the proper methodology of the social sciences. The field of collective intentionality is populated with scholars who have adopted methodological individualism…
Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility
The debate surrounding the issue of collective moral responsibility is often steeped in metaphysical issues of agency and personhood. I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in "Freedom and Resentment" (1968). Strawson argues that the participant reactive attitudes – attitudes like resentment, grati…
Challenging Epistemic Individualism
Contemporary analytic epistemology exhibits an individualistic bias. The standard analyses of knowledge found in current epistemological discussions assume that the only epistemic agents worthy of philosophical consideration are individual cognizers. The idea that collectives could be genuine knowers has received little, if any, serious consideration. This individualistic bias seems to be motivated by the view that epistemology is about things th…
Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences
In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group. Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view…
Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences
In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group. Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view…
Challenging Epistemic Individualism
Contemporary analytic epistemology exhibits an individualistic bias. The standard analyses of knowledge found in current epistemological discussions assume that the only epistemic agents worthy of philosophical consideration are individual cognizers. The idea that collectives could be genuine knowers has received little, if any, serious consideration. This individualistic bias seems to be motivated by the view that epistemology is about things th…
Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences
In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group. Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view…
Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility
The debate surrounding the issue of collective moral responsibility is often steeped in metaphysical issues of agency and personhood. I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in "Freedom and Resentment" (1968). Strawson argues that the participant reactive attitudes – attitudes like resentment, grati…
Collective Intentionality and Methodology in the Social Sciences
This chapter discusses the extent to which philosophers within the field of collective intentionality have adopted an individualistic approach to explaining social phenomena. Methodological individualism, as it developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, was a thesis about the proper methodology of the social sciences. The field of collective intentionality is populated with scholars who have adopted methodological individualism…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Intentionality (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works) · Agency (philosophy) (1 works)