Challenging Epistemic Individualism

Bibliographic Data

ID19475556
AuthorsDeborah Tollefsen (corresponding author), Deborah Perron Tollefsen, ProtoSociology Project
Year2002
Volume16
Pages86-117
Publication date2002-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueProtoSociology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1434-4319
PublisherPhilosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.5840/protosociology20021622
OpenAlexW2739658886
LanguageEN
Citations received13

Contemporary analytic epistemology exhibits an individualistic bias. The standard analyses of knowledge found in current epistemological discussions assume that the only epistemic agents worthy of philosophical consideration are individual cognizers. The idea that collectives could be genuine knowers has received little, if any, serious consideration. This individualistic bias seems to be motivated by the view that epistemology is about things that go on inside the head. In this paper I challenge this type of epistemic individualism by arguing that certain groups are intentional agents and that cognition occurs at the level of groups. In section I, I extend a plausible and well-defended account of individual intentionality to organizations. In section II, I appeal to research on distributed cognition in order to challenge the view that cognition occurs exclusively in the individual mind-brain. Having established that groups can be believers and cognizers, I turn to the issue of the justification of group belief. In section III, consider whether a reliabilist account of justification can be extended to groups

Epistemology · Individualism · Political science · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Psychology

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