Daniel Cardona
Biographic Data
| ID | 6038101 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Cardona |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Cardona |
| SIGNATURE | CARDONA D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universitat de les Illes Balears |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4511-0700 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members
We analyze the choice of the policy platform that a group of heterogeneous challengers will support to confront the current policy in a subsequent contest between them and the status-quo defenders. The choice of this alternative policy will affect not only the incentives of challengers to get involved in the conflict (intra-group effect), but also the mobilization of status-quo defenders (inter-group effect). We disentangle these two effects and …
Investments, Positive Externalities, and Majority Bargaining
This study analyzes the welfare implications of requiring either unanimity or a simple majority in negotiations to distribute a budget among three agents who could previously invest to generate positive consumption externalities for others. This complements Cardona and Rubí-Barceló (2014), who consider only the unanimity case. We show that reducing the majority requirement reduces the profitability of investments, and consequently alleviates over…
On the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods
Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function
No prominent works on this page.
Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function
On the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods
Investments, Positive Externalities, and Majority Bargaining
This study analyzes the welfare implications of requiring either unanimity or a simple majority in negotiations to distribute a budget among three agents who could previously invest to generate positive consumption externalities for others. This complements Cardona and Rubí-Barceló (2014), who consider only the unanimity case. We show that reducing the majority requirement reduces the profitability of investments, and consequently alleviates over…
Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members
We analyze the choice of the policy platform that a group of heterogeneous challengers will support to confront the current policy in a subsequent contest between them and the status-quo defenders. The choice of this alternative policy will affect not only the incentives of challengers to get involved in the conflict (intra-group effect), but also the mobilization of status-quo defenders (inter-group effect). We disentangle these two effects and …
Economics (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Political science (3 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Bargaining power (1 work)