Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members

Bibliographic Data

ID21470612
AuthorsDaniel Cardona (0000-0002-4511-0700, Universitat de les Illes Balears, corresponding author), Jenny De Freitas (0000-0002-3602-5387, Universitat de les Illes Balears), Antoni Rubí-Barceló (0000-0002-5478-554X), Antoni Rubí‐Barceló (Universitat de les Illes Balears)
Year2023
Volume61
Issue1
Pages199-219
Publication date2023-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSocial Choice and Welfare (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0176-1714 • E-ISSN: 1432-217X
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01446-y
OpenAlexW4313357249
LanguageEN
References cited36

We analyze the choice of the policy platform that a group of heterogeneous challengers will support to confront the current policy in a subsequent contest between them and the status-quo defenders. The choice of this alternative policy will affect not only the incentives of challengers to get involved in the conflict (intra-group effect), but also the mobilization of status-quo defenders (inter-group effect). We disentangle these two effects and show that the degree of polarization (distance between the alternative and the status-quo policy) depends on how the efforts that groups exert in the contest affect their winning probabilities. Our results illustrate how the conflict resolution rules may affect the degree of polarization in political confrontations

Conflict resolution · CONTEST · Economics · Incentive · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Status quo · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Psychology · Social Capital and Networks · Social Psychology

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