Antoni Rubí-Barceló
Biographic Data
| ID | 6038102 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Antoni Rubí-Barceló |
| GIVEN NAMES | Antoni |
| FAMILY NAME | Rubí-Barceló |
| SIGNATURE | RUBÍ-BARCELÓ A |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5478-554X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions
We exploit the properties of homogeneous functions to characterize the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria of n -player symmetric games in which each player’s revenue function is not homogeneous but it can be decomposed into the sum of homogeneous functions with different degrees of homogeneity. Our results aim to provide a pathway for an easy computation of symmetric equilibria for this type of games. We discuss our results in a Cournot game…
Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members
We analyze the choice of the policy platform that a group of heterogeneous challengers will support to confront the current policy in a subsequent contest between them and the status-quo defenders. The choice of this alternative policy will affect not only the incentives of challengers to get involved in the conflict (intra-group effect), but also the mobilization of status-quo defenders (inter-group effect). We disentangle these two effects and …
Investments, Positive Externalities, and Majority Bargaining
This study analyzes the welfare implications of requiring either unanimity or a simple majority in negotiations to distribute a budget among three agents who could previously invest to generate positive consumption externalities for others. This complements Cardona and Rubí-Barceló (2014), who consider only the unanimity case. We show that reducing the majority requirement reduces the profitability of investments, and consequently alleviates over…
On the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods
No prominent works on this page.
On the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods
Investments, Positive Externalities, and Majority Bargaining
This study analyzes the welfare implications of requiring either unanimity or a simple majority in negotiations to distribute a budget among three agents who could previously invest to generate positive consumption externalities for others. This complements Cardona and Rubí-Barceló (2014), who consider only the unanimity case. We show that reducing the majority requirement reduces the profitability of investments, and consequently alleviates over…
Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members
We analyze the choice of the policy platform that a group of heterogeneous challengers will support to confront the current policy in a subsequent contest between them and the status-quo defenders. The choice of this alternative policy will affect not only the incentives of challengers to get involved in the conflict (intra-group effect), but also the mobilization of status-quo defenders (inter-group effect). We disentangle these two effects and …
Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions
We exploit the properties of homogeneous functions to characterize the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria of n -player symmetric games in which each player’s revenue function is not homogeneous but it can be decomposed into the sum of homogeneous functions with different degrees of homogeneity. Our results aim to provide a pathway for an easy computation of symmetric equilibria for this type of games. We discuss our results in a Cournot game…
Economics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · CONTEST (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Algorithm (1 work) · Bargaining power (1 work) · Best response (1 work) · Business (1 work) · Combinatorics (1 work)