Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21405321 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Walter Ferrarese (0000-0003-4642-4522, Universitat de les Illes Balears), Antoni Rubí-Barceló (0000-0002-5478-554X), Antoni Rubí‐Barceló (Universitat de les Illes Balears, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 96 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 333-349 |
| Publication date | 2024-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theory and Decision (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5833 • E-ISSN: 1573-7187 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11238-023-09952-w |
| OpenAlex | W4386121839 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
We exploit the properties of homogeneous functions to characterize the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria of n -player symmetric games in which each player’s revenue function is not homogeneous but it can be decomposed into the sum of homogeneous functions with different degrees of homogeneity. Our results aim to provide a pathway for an easy computation of symmetric equilibria for this type of games. We discuss our results in a Cournot game, a contest game, and a public good game
Algorithm · Best response · Combinatorics · Computation · CONTEST · Cournot competition · Equilibrium selection · Game theory · Homogeneity (statistics) · Homogeneous · Homogeneous function · Mathematical economics · Nash equilibrium · Repeated game · Statistics · Strategy · Symmetric equilibrium · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |